

# **Appendix I**

## **Solaris 2.5.1 Test Procedures**

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 14** Ensure the audit subsystem is enabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Operating systems generally maintain a number of log files that keep track of system, security, and application information. These log files form the basis of an operating system's auditing subsystem. Auditing can be enabled or disabled. It should always be enabled for a secure system.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command to verify if auditing is enabled:  #auditconfig -getcond	The -getcond option obtains the machine audit condition. The response is one of three possible conditions:  auditing - Auditing is enabled and turned on no audit - Auditing is enabled but turned off disabled - The audit module is not enabled  An error message with the format "auditconfig: error = Invalid argument(22)" indicates that the BSM option has not been enabled on the system and the auditconfig command cannot be used.	Basic Security Module should be installed and turned on. The -chkconf option of the auditconfig command checks the configuration of kernel audit events to class mappings and reports any inconsistencies.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Defined Audit Events

**Test Objective 272** Verify that the kernel audit events have not been modified inappropriately.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the following file:  /etc/security/audit_event  Compare its contents with the default kernel audit events file supplied with Solaris.	Any kernel audit event modifications must be justified.	The system actions that are auditable are defined as audit events in the /etc/security/audit_event file. Each auditable event is defined in the audit_event file by a symbolic name, an event number, a set of preselection classes, and a short description.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 15** Ensure audit is correctly configured and collects the required audit events (login and logout, use of privileged commands, application and session initiation, use of print command, DAC permission modification, export to media...).

**DII COE SRS Requirement:**

- 3.2.2.5 At a minimum, the following audit events shall be audited:
  - 3.2.2.5.1 Login (unsuccessful and successful) and Logout (successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.2 Use of privileged commands (unsuccessful and successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.3 Application and session initiation (unsuccessful and successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.4 Use of print command (unsuccessful and successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.5 Discretionary access control permission modification (unsuccessful and successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.6 Export to media (successful)
  - 3.2.2.5.7 Unauthorized access attempts to files (unsuccessful)
  - 3.2.2.5.8 System startup and shutdown (unsuccessful and successful).

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  #/usr/sbin/auditconfig -chkconf	The command "auditconfig -chkconf" should not display any audit mapping inconsistencies. If the mappings are consistent, then the command will execute without printing any message as in the following:  #/usr/sbin/auditconfig -chkconf	Basic Security Module should be installed and turned on.  The -chkconf option of the auditconfig command checks the configuration of kernel audit events to class mappings and reports any inconsistencies.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Audit Events

**Test Objective 17** Verify the system provides the capability to select and enable auditable events including use of I&A, introduction of objects into a user's address space, deletion of objects, trusted user actions, print use, etc.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.2 The COE shall provide the capability to select and enable auditable events.

3.2.2.3 The COE shall be able to audit the following types of events:

3.2.2.3.1 Use of I&A mechanisms

3.2.2.3.2 Introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation)

3.2.2.3.3 Deletion of objects

3.2.2.3.4 Actions taken by trusted users

3.2.2.3.5 Production of printed output

3.2.2.3.6 Other security relevant events.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  vi /etc/security/audit_class  Compare its content with the default kernel audit events file supplied with Solaris 2.5.1.	Files match indicating that audit classes have not been modified inappropriately. Any audit class modifications must be justified. # # User Level Class Masks # # Developers: If you change this file you must also edit audit.h. # # File Format: # mask:name:description # 0x00000000:no:invalid class 0x00000001:fr:file read 0x00000002:fw:file write 0x00000004:fa:file attribute access 0x00000008:fm:file attribute modify 0x00000010:fc:file create 0x00000020:fd:file delete 0x00000040:cl:file close 0x00000080:pc:process 0x00000100:nt:network 0x00000200:ip:ipc 0x00000400:na:non-attribute 0x00000800:ad:administrative 0x00001000:lo:login or logout	Each audit event is defined as belonging to an audit class or classes. By assigning events into classes, an administrator can more easily deal with large numbers of events. When naming a class, one simultaneously addresses all of the events in that class. Whether or not an auditable event is recorded in the audit trail depends on whether the administrator preselects a class for auditing that includes the specific event.	

		0x00004000:ap:application 0x20000000:io:ioctl 0x40000000:ex:exec 0x80000000:ot:other 0xffffffff:all:all classes		
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**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Audit of Unsuccessful login attempts

**Test Objective 273** Verify that unsuccessful login attempts are logged.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Verify the following file exists:  /var/adm/loginlog	The /var/adm/loginlog file should exist on the host. Note: If this file does NOT exist on the host, skip the remainder of the steps for this test.	Unsuccessful attempts to log into the system can be recorded. If the /var/adm/loginlog file does not exist, nothing is logged.	
2	Attempt to login using an invalid password on a VALID user account. Repeat this step 4 times for a total of 5 times. Browse the /var/adm/loginlog file.	An entry exists in the file detailing the unsuccessful login attempts.	After a user makes five consecutive unsuccessful attempts to log in, all attempts are recorded in the file /var/adm/loginlog. If a user makes fewer than five unsuccessful login attempts, none of the attempts are logged. Note: Some environments, such as DII COE or CSE-SS, will lock out the user on the fifth invalid login attempt.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 196** Verify the system is capable of detecting when the audit file reaches a configurable threshold and audit records are not lost if this threshold is reached. If the audit file becomes full, verify the system is shutdown until the audit data is archived.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.1.3 The COE shall be capable of detecting when the audit trail reaches a configurable threshold (i.e., % of capacity), ensuring that audit data is not lost, and maintaining system availability.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  #auditconfig -getpolicy  Fill up the partition holding the audit data (location of audit can be found in the /etc/security/audit_control file). Add space to bring total usage to 100%. Use the 'mkfile' command to generate space. This should result in mail being sent to the isso (more accurately the audit_warn mail alias on the local host which should point to the isso's normal email address).	The command should return audit policies = ? where the ? does not include "cnt".  Email in the system administrator's normal mail folder indicating an audit error had occurred on the machine.  The cnt policy flag should not be enabled ensuring that processes will suspend when audit resources are exhausted.	The auditconfig command provides a command line interface to get and set kernel audit parameters. The -getpolicy parameter causes the kernel audit policy to be displayed. If the cnt policy flag is enabled, the kernel is directed not to suspend processes when audit resources are exhausted. Instead, audit records are dropped and a count is kept of the number of records dropped. By default, processes are suspended until audit resources become available.	
2	The threshold for the warning message is set in the file /etc/security/audit_control in the 'minfree' line. Adjust this value appropriate to site requirements.	A properly tuned audit partition that will send email to the system administrator when the audit partition begins to fill up.	The default threshold setting is "20," but this value may be set to a different value depending on the site requirements.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Audit Reduction

**Test Objective 24** Determine if an audit reduction capability exists. This capability can be either OS provided or an add-on product.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>Use the audit reduce feature in Solaris to assist with review of audit.</p> <p>To review an entire audit file type "cd /home/audit" then "auditreduce *  praudit". If desired this audit can be redirected into a file by adding "&gt; filename" at the end of the command.</p>	All of the audit records present on the system are displayed on the screen.	<p>Audit is sometimes stored in many locations. The location of audit data can be determined by viewing the /etc/audit_control file. The directory location follows the key word "dir:".</p> <p>This audit can be redirected into a file by adding "&gt; filename" at the end of the command. To review the audit records pertaining to a specific user and date, type:</p> <pre>auditreduce -d yyyymmddhhmmss -u userid *   praudit</pre>	
2	<p>Display the audit for a specific user for a specific date by typing:</p> <pre>"auditreduce -d yyyymmddhhmmss -u userid *   praudit"</pre> <p>Note: it is possible to specify the review of all audits before a specific date using the -b option or all dates after a specific date using the -a.</p>	All the audit records for the date/time and user selected will be displayed to the screen.	<p>To review all audit data before or after a specific date, use the -b option or -a option, respectively. To display the audit data for a specific event, use the -c with the audit reduce command. For example, to display all logins that have been audited, type:</p> <pre>auditreduce -c lo *   praudit</pre>	
3	<p>Display the audit for a specific event by using the -c with the audit reduce command (e.g., display all logins that have been audited with the command:</p> <pre>"auditreduce -c lo *   praudit"</pre>	All the audit records related to logins will be displayed to the screen.	The audit class identifiers are described in /etc/security/audit_event.	



	Note these audit class identifiers are described in /etc/security/audit_control.			
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**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 18** Identify any users for whom auditing has been disabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** An audit flag is on for all existing users at initial conversion to a trusted system. Auditing for individual users can be disabled.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  vi /etc/security/audit_user  Identify any user contained in the /etc/passwd file that is not also contained in the /etc/security/audit_user file.	The file /etc/security/audit_user has a line, beginning with the user's login name, for each authorized user. Also, no audit class in the audit_control file is listed after a second colon for any user line in this file.	The system audit level applies to all users, unless the user has an entry in the /etc/security/audit_users file. The user audit level overrides the system audit level. The fields in /etc/security/audit_users file are separated by colons and are defined as follows:  Username:always audit flags:never audit flags  All users should be subject to auditing. A unique identity must be associated with all auditable actions.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 19** Verify required parameters are identified for each recorded audit event including date and time of event, userid, type of event, success or failure of event, for I&A events, the origin of the request, etc.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.4 For each recorded event, at a minimum the audit record shall identify:

- 3.2.2.4.1 Date and time of the event
- 3.2.2.4.2 UserID
- 3.2.2.4.3 Type of event
- 3.2.2.4.4 Success or failure of the event
- 3.2.2.4.5 For I&A events, the origin of the request (e.g., terminal ID)
- 3.2.2.4.6 For events that introduce an object into a user's address space, and for object deletion events, the name of the object, and in MLS systems, the object's security level.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As an UNPRIVILEGED user attempt to view the /etc/security/audit_control file using the command:  #/usr/bin/more /etc/security/audit_control	Permission to view the file is denied to an unprivileged user.	The audit_control file lists audit file systems and audit configurations for the audit daemon: auditd. Each line consists of a title and a string, separated by a colon. The system administrator defines four kinds of lines in the audit_control file:  - The audit flags line (flags:) contains the audit flags that define what classes of events are audited for all users on the machine.  - The non-attributable flags line (naflags:) contains the audit flags that define what classes of events are audited when an action cannot be attributed to a specific user.  - The audit threshold line (minfree:) defines the	

			<p>minimum free space level for all audit filesystems. The minfree percentage must be greater than or equal to 0. The default is 20%.</p> <p>- The directory definition lines (dir:) defines which audit filesystems and directories the machine will use to store its audit trail files. (SunSHIELD Basic Security Module Guide)</p> <p>The audit_user file stores per-user auditing preselection data. Each entry in the audit_user file has the form:</p> <p>username:always-audit-flags:never-audit-flags</p> <p>(Solaris 2.5.1 audit_user man page)</p>	
2	<p>As root attempt to view the /etc/security/audit_control file using the command:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/more /etc/security/audit_control</pre>	<p>The audit event configuration for accounts on the system shows that, at a minimum, the following events are audited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(ad) Normal administrative operation,</li> <li>(lo) Login, logout,</li> <li>(fc) Object creation</li> <li>(fd) Object deletion</li> <li>(-fw) Failure to write to a file</li> </ul>	<p>The audit_control file lists audit file systems and audit configurations for the audit daemon, auditd. Each line consists of a title and a string, separated by a colon. The system administrator defines four kinds of lines in the audit_control file:</p> <p>- The audit flags line (flags:) contains the audit flags that define what classes of events are audited for all users on the machine.</p> <p>- The non-attributable flags line (naflags:) contains the audit flags that define what classes of events are audited when an action cannot be attributed to a specific user.</p>	

			<p>- The audit threshold line (minfree:) defines the minimum free space level for all audit filesystems. The minfree percentage must be greater than or equal to 0. The default is 20%.</p> <p>- The directory definition lines (dir:) defines which audit filesystems and directories the machine will use to store its audit trail files. (SunSHIELD Basic Security Module Guide)</p> <p>The audit_user file stores per-user auditing preselection data. Each entry in the audit_user file has the form:</p> <p>username:always-audit-flags:never-audit-flags</p> <p>(Solaris 2.5.1 audit_user man page)</p>	
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**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Application Level

**Test Objective 23** Verify the system provides an auditing function capable of accepting application level audit logging requests and a standard audit format is provided for use in application level auditing.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.8 The COE shall provide an auditing function capable of accepting application level audit logging requests.

3.2.2.8.1 The COE shall provide a standard audit format (e.g., syslog format) for use in application level auditing.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  ps -eaf   grep syslog	Output on the screen should resemble the following:  \$ps -eaf   grep syslog root 161 1 53 Jul 29 ? 0:01 /usr/sbin/syslogd cisso 893 427 9 14:07:06 pts/2 0:00 grep syslog \$	/etc/syslog.conf contains the configuration parameters for syslogd.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 21** Verify the audit\_warn script has not been modified inappropriately.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  vi /etc/security/audit_warn	The file: /etc/security/audit_warn has not been changed from the default /etc/security/audit_warn.	Whenever the audit daemon encounters an unusual condition while writing audit records, it invokes the /etc/security/audit_warn script. This script can be customized by individual sites to warn of conditions that might require manual intervention, or to handle them automatically. For all error conditions, audit_warn writes a message to the console and sends a message to the audit_warn alias.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 22** Verify the audit\_warn alias has been configured correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Whenever the audit daemon encounters an unusual condition while writing audit records, it invokes the /etc/security/audit\_warn script. This script can be customized by individual sites to warn of conditions that might require manual intervention, or to handle them automatically. For all error conditions audit\_warn writes a message to the console and sends a message to the audit\_warn alias.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  vi /etc/aliases	An entry should appear for the "audit_warn" alias, and the alias should be the name of an actual account.  #ident "@(#)aliases 1.13 92/07/14 SMI" /* SVr4.0 1.1 */  ## # Aliases can have any mix of upper and lower case on the left-hand side, # but the right-hand side should be proper case (usually lower). # # The program "newaliases" will need to be run after # NOTE: this file is updated for any changes to # show through to sendmail. # # @(#)aliases 1.8 86/07/16 SMI ##  # Following alias is required by the mail protocol, RFC 822. # Set it to the address of a HUMAN who deals with this system's mail problems. Postmaster: root audit_warn: cseisso, root  # Alias for mailer daemon; returned messages from our MAILER-DAEMON # should be routed to our local Postmaster.	Whenever the audit daemon encounters an unusual condition while writing audit records, it invokes the /etc/security/audit_warn script. This script can be customized by individual sites to warn of conditions that might require manual intervention, or to handle them automatically. For all error conditions audit_warn writes a message to the console and sends a message to the audit_warn alias.	



		MAILER-DAEMON: postmaster  # Aliases to handle mail to programs or files, e.g., news or vacation # decode: "/usr/bin/uudecode" nobody: /dev/null  # Sample aliases:  # Alias for distribution list, members specified here: #staff:wnj,mosher,sam,ecc,mckusick,sk lower,olson,rwh@ernie  # Alias for distribution list, members specified elsewhere: #keyboards: include:/usr/jfarrell/keyboards.list  # Alias for a person, so they can receive mail by several names: #epa:eric  ##### # Local aliases below # #####	
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**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Correlation of Audit Logs

**Test Objective 20** Verify the system provides the capability to correlate all system, administrative, and audit logs.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.7 The COE shall provide the capability to correlate all system administrative and audit logs (e.g., database management system logs, operating system audit logs, and other system logs).

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	View all logs including, but not limited to:  utmp, loginlog, lastlog, sulog, aculog, xferlog, syslog, and the c2 audit logs.  Ensure the date and time is recorded for correlation of audit data between the various audit logs.	The date and time is included in all audit logs for each audit event recorded.	Note: On the test machines, the aculog was empty and the c2 and xferlog log files did not exist.	

**Topic:** AUDIT

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 25** Verify the audit data is protected by the system so that access to it is limited to only those authorized to view the audit data. In addition, verify the audit data is protected from change or deletion by general users.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.2.1.1 The audit data shall be protected by the system so that access to it is limited to those who are authorized to view audit data.  
3.2.2.1.2 The audit function shall be protected from change or deletion by general users.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, determine the name of the audit files listed in a line starting with "dir:" in the /etc/security/audit_control file. For each filename listed in the audit_control file, as a NON-privileged user, check the file permissions, attempt to gain unauthorized access, and attempt to delete the file using the following commands:  ls -l <filename> more <filename> vi <filename> rm <filename>	Each command should cause an error message to be returned. Every audit filesystem listed in a line starting with "dir:" in the /etc/security/audit_control file should be accessible only to security administrators.		

**Topic:** Availability

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 51** Verify the system provides the capability to perform system and database backups on a periodic basis.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.3.4 The COE shall provide the capability to perform system and database backups on a periodic basis.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	View the files contained in the /var/spool/cron/crontabs directory to determine whether the system is backed up automatically on a scheduled basis. From the system logbook or the System Administrator determine when the last system backup was performed and if backups are regularly performed. Determine if the backup tapes were labeled correctly.	Backups are regularly performed either by cron jobs or by operational procedures.	Cron jobs executed are logged in the file /var/cron/log.	

**Topic:** Availability

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 52** Verify the system provides the capability to recover from failures using system and database backups.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.3.5 The COE shall provide the capability to recover from failures using system and database backups.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Use the following command to determine if the "ufsrestore" executable is loaded on the workstation:  ls -l /lib/fs/ufs/ufsrestore	If the executable is loaded on the workstation, the file will be listed with a size and date, otherwise an error message will be displayed stating "File not found."	A current set of backups must exist to complete this test.	

**Topic:** CRON JOBS

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 129** Verify cron has been securely configured. Determine which form of cron is used on the system (see rationale for cron forms).

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** UNIX has programs and systems that run automatically. Many of these systems require special privileges. If an attacker can compromise these systems, he may be able to gain direct unauthorized access to other parts of the operating system, or plan a back door to gain access at a later time.

There are three forms of crontab files. The oldest form has a line with a command to be executed whenever the time field is matched by the cron daemon. To execute the commands from this old-style crontab file as a user other than root, it is necessary to make the command listed in the crontab file use the su command.

The second form of the cron file has an extra field that indicates on whose behalf the command is being run.

The third form of cron protects directories with a separate crontab file for each user. The cron daemon examines all the files and dispatches jobs based on the user owning the file.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the /etc/default/cron file to determine the PATH and SUPATH for cron jobs. The PATH variable is used for user jobs, the SUPATH variable for root jobs.	Directories in the PATH and SUPATH and the files contained in these directories are not world or group writeable.	The PATH and SUPATH variables determine where the system looks to find executables. The security implications of setting PATH and SUPATH should be carefully considered.	
2	Type in the following commands:  #ls -ldgb /var #ls -ldgb /var/adm #ls -ldgb /usr/spool #ls -ldgb /usr/spool/cron #ls -ldgb /usr/spool/cron/crontabs #ls -ldgb /usr/spool/cron/atjobs #ls -ldgb /usr #ls -ldgb /usr/lib	None of the directories are world or group writeable, but SOME of the FILES may be group writeable.	If any of the directories are group writeable they should be changed using the "chmod 755 <dir name>" command.	
3	Type in the following commands:  #/bin/find /var/spool/cron/crontabs - type f -exec ls -ldgb { } \; -exec /usr/ucb/more { } \;	All user crontab files are owned by the correct user and group, all files that are referenced in a users crontab file, or that are referenced by files in the crontab file are not world or group	Ensure root cron job files do NOT source any other files not owned by root or which are group or world writeable.	

	#/bin/find /var/spool/cron/atjobs -type f -exec ls -ldgdb { } \; -exec /usr/ucb/more { } \;	writeable, and the cron job tasks are appropriate.	This is done by TIGER and maybe COPS and SPI.	
4	Perform an ls -ldg and more on each file referenced in each crontab file to verify that none of the files are world writeable (check directories in the path of the referenced files also).	All files that are referenced in the crontab file, or that are referenced by files in the crontab file are not world or group writeable and contain valid entries.		
5	Type in the following commands:  #ls -ldb /var/cron #ls -ldb /var/cron/log #/usr/ucb/more /var/cron/log	The cron log directory and the cron log are not world or group writeable, and the cron jobs logged have been approved.		

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Deadman Lockout

**Test Objective 59** Verify the lock out function is available for users to manually lock their terminals and users are required to re-authenticate themselves to unlock a locked terminal.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.4.12.4 The lock out function shall be available for users to manually invoke.  
3.2.4.12.5 Users shall be required to re-authenticate themselves to unlock a locked terminal.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  #xlock	Screensaver appears.	If the command results in a "xlock: not found" error, check for the presence of xlock on the system using the following command:  #find / -name "*xlock*" -print	
2	Press the Enter key and enter the Password.	The password entry prompt appears and the screen unlocks.		
3	OR - On DII COE Computers, click on the padlock symbol on the status bar at the bottom of the screen.	Screensaver appears.		



**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Logging Privileged Commands

**Test Objective 56** Verify use of privileged commands (e.g., su) is logged and that a message is displayed on the console.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  vi /etc/default/su	The following lines should be uncommented (i.e., should not have a "#" in front of them):  SULOG=/var/adm/sulog CONSOLE=/dev/console	Entries in the file /etc/default/su determine the default conditions of the su command. The following entry enables a log of each time the su command is used to change to another user:  SULOG=/var/adm/sulog  (Security, Performance, and Accounting Administration)  A record of every time the su command is used, who uses it, and when it is made in the log file, /var/adm/sulog, enabling the system administrator to track who is using the superuser account.  The following entry enables a display on the console each time an attempt is made to use the su command to gain root access from a remote system.  CONSOLE=/dev/console	

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 53** Verify System Administration Tools are configured securely and their use is limited to appropriate users.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  ls -ldb /usr/bin/admintool	The following permissions are displayed:  -r-xr-x--- bin bin /usr/bin/admintool	Note: Sun patch #103558-0? is a patch for the admintool program. It is available as a separate patch or in the latest 2.5.1_Recommended cluster.	
2	Verify that the admin security level is NOT set to level 0. Browse the following file:  /etc/inetd.conf	The admin entry does not specify security level 0 (i.e., the string "-S 0" does not appear in the admin entry).	<p>The Administration Tool uses the distributed administration framework daemon (admin) to carry out the security tasks. The admin daemon process executes the request on the server on behalf of the client process.</p> <p>Each request contains a set of credentials with a user ID (UID) and a set of group IDs (GIDs) to which the UID belongs. The server uses these credentials to perform identity and permission checks. Three levels of authentication security are available:</p> <p>- Level 0 (AUTH_NONE) - No identity checking is done. All user IDs are set to the nobody identity. This level is used mostly for testing.</p> <p>- Level 1 (AUTH_SYS) - The server accepts the original user and group</p>	

			<p>identities directly from the client system and uses them as the identities for the authorization checks. The server does not check that the UID of the client represents the same user on the server system. It is assumed the administrator has made the user IDs and group IDs consistent on all systems in the network. Checks are made to see if the client has permission to execute the request.</p> <p>- Level 2 (AUTH_DES) - Credentials are validated using DES authentication, and the server checks that the client has permission to execute the request. The user and group identities are obtained from databases on the server system by mapping the user's DES network identity (the DES entry in the NIS+ Cred table, for example) to a local UID and set of GIDs. The database used depends on which name service is selected on the server system. This level provides the most secure environment for performing administrative tasks and requires that a publickey entry exist for all server systems where the admin daemon is running, and for all users accessing the tools.</p> <p>The Administration Tool uses the Level 1 authentication as the default. The security can be tightened to require Level 2 security checks by editing the /etc/inetd.conf file on each system, and</p>	
--	--	--	---	--

			adding the -S 2 option to the admind entry. The servers on the domain must be set up to use DES security.	
3	<p>Execute the following command:</p> <pre># grep '^group' /etc/nsswitch.conf</pre>	<p>The group entry in nsswitch.conf will appear. The entry should be in one of the following forms:</p> <pre>group: files nisplus or group: files or group: nisplus</pre>	<p>The Administration Tool permissions are granted to users who are members of the sysadmin group. This means that a user performing a task that modifies administration data on a system using the Administration Tool must be a member of the sysadmin group on the system where the task is being executed.</p> <p>In the case of the Administration Tool, the /etc/group is searched for an entry for the sysadmin group (GID=14). If the entry exists, it uses the information listed there, and does not check the NIS+ group table.</p>	
4	<p>If the nsswitch.conf entry for group is of the form:</p> <pre>group: nisplus</pre> <p>then execute the following command:</p> <pre># niscat group.org_dir   grep '^sysadmin'</pre> <p>Otherwise, execute the following command:</p> <pre># grep '^sysadmin' /etc/group</pre>	<p>Only users authorized to execute the Administration Tool "admintool" should be members of the sysadmin group.</p>	<p>The Administration Tool permissions are granted to users who are members of the sysadmin group. This means that a user performing a task that modifies administration data on a system using the Administration Tool must be a member of the sysadmin group on the system where the task is being executed.</p> <p>In the case of the Administration Tool, the /etc/group file is searched for an entry for the sysadmin group (GID=14). If the entry exists, it uses the information listed there, and does not check the NIS+ group table.</p>	

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 57** Verify the access control information for the device maps is appropriate for each physical device.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the following file:  /etc/security/device_maps	In the file /etc/security/device_maps, only the device special files delivered with Solaris 2.5.1 are identified for each physical device.	NOTE: This step cannot be performed if BSM is not installed. If BSM has been enabled, the device_maps file contains access control information about each physical device. Each device is represented by a one line entry of the form:  device-name:device-type:device-list  where  - device-name is an arbitrary ASCII string naming the physical device. - device-type is an arbitrary ASCII string naming the generic device type. - device-list is a list of the device special files associated with the physical device. This field contains valid device special file path names separated by white space.	

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 63** Verify the system is capable of restricting access to objects based on the user's identity and on access modes (e.g., read, write, execute).

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.4.2 The COE shall restrict access to objects based on the user's identity and on access modes (e.g., read, write, execute).

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As unprivileged user1, execute the following commands:  user1>echo ls -CFA > /tmp/file1 user1>chmod 700 /tmp/file1 user1>ls -ld /tmp/file1 user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user1>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwx----- 1 user1 8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 ls -CFA		
2	As unprivileged user2 (a member of the same group), execute the following commands:  user2>ls /tmp/file1 user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 user2>echo date > /tmp/file1 user2>/tmp/file1	Output similar to the following will be produced:  user2>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwx----- 1 user1 8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user2>more /tmp/file1 /tmp/file1: Permission denied user2>echo date > /tmp/file1 /tmp/file1: Permission denied user2>/tmp/file1 /tmp/file1: Permission denied user2>		
3	As unprivileged user1, execute the following commands:  user1>chmod 750 user1>ls /tmp/file1 user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user1>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwxr-x--- 1 user1 8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 ls -CFA		
4	As unprivileged user2 (a member of the same group), execute the following commands:  user2>ls /tmp/file1 user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 user2>echo date > /tmp/file1 user2>/tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user2>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwxrwx--- 1 user1 8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 ls -CFA user2>echo date > /tmp/file1		

		/tmp/file1: Permission denied user2>/tmp/file1 file1      file2      file3      file4 file5 file6      file7      file8      file9 file10		
5	As unprivileged user1, execute the following commands:  user1>chmod 770 user1>ls /tmp/file1 user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user1>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwxrwx--- 1 user1      8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user1>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 ls -CFA		
6	As unprivileged user2 (a member of the same group), execute the following commands:  user2>ls -ld /tmp/file1 user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 user2>echo date > /tmp/file1 user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 user2>/tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user2>ls -ld /tmp/file1 -rwxrwx--- 1 user1      8 Oct 17 16:49 /tmp/file1* user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 ls -CFA user2>echo date > /tmp/file1 user2>usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1 date user2>/tmp/file1 Thu Oct 17 17:37:06 EDT 1996		
7	As unprivileged user1, execute the following commands:  user1>rm /tmp/file1 user1>ls /tmp/file1	Output will look similar to the following:  user1>rm /tmp/file1 user1>ls -ld /tmp/file1 /tmp/file1: No such file or directory		

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Privileged Accounts

**Test Objective 55** Verify the privileged user's account (e.g., root) and anything owned by that user is configured securely.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  find / -user root ! -group bin \ -type f \( -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) \ -exec ls -lgdb {} \;	Permissions are such that no user is able to write to any file especially executable and SUID, SGID files.		
2	Type the following command:  find / -user root ! -group bin ! -group \ sys -type d \( -perm -2 -o -perm \ -20 \) -exec ls -lgdb {} \;	Permissions are such that no user is able to write to any directory that should not be written to.		



**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Protection of Objects

**Test Objective 62** Verify the system protects objects from unauthorized access and is capable of including or excluding access to each object on a per user and on a per group basis.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.4.5 The COE shall, either by explicit user action or by default, protect objects from unauthorized access.  
3.2.4.6 The COE shall be capable of including or excluding access to each object on a per user and on a per group basis.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Administrator/Superuser logs into the host and assumes root.	The host system prompt is displayed on the screen.		
2	Administrator/Superuser edits the contents of the /etc/shadow file.	Contents of the /etc/shadow file are displayed on the screen. Administrator/Superuser is able to edit the file.		
3	Administrator/Superuser edits the contents of the /etc/group file.	Contents of the /etc/group file are displayed on the screen. Administrator/Superuser is able to edit the file.		
4	Administrator/Superuser displays the file creation mask (umask) for his account. Type the command 'umask'.	The file creation mask (umask) for his account is set to 77 (owner is given read, write, and execute privilege; group and world are given no privileges).	If you do not have 77 as a umask, change the /.cshrc or /.profile files by adding the line "umask 0077" to the beginning of the file. You need to logoff before this change goes into effect.	
5	Test default umask by creating new account and verifying correct DAC permissions. As root, run the admintool application, and create a new account called test2. Set the home directory to /home/test2.	The admin creates the account.		
6	Login to the host as the newly created test2 account. Type the command 'telnet localhost' and login as test2.	The user ends up logged in as test2 within the window.		
7	Verify the test2 account has the proper umask for correct DAC permissions. Type the command 'umask'.	The system should display the result as '77'.		
8	Administrator/Superuser logs out of the host.	The host login prompt is displayed on the screen.		
9	test1 logs into the host.	Open Windows is started and three host windows are opened on the screen.		

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** User Group Controls

**Test Objective 61** Verify User Group controls are implemented and functional and the system provides a means to associate definable sets of applications with a work environment (e.g., sessions) and assign multiple work environments to users on a per-user basis.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.4.3 The COE shall allow users to specify and control sharing of objects by named individuals or defined groups of individuals, or by both.  
3.2.4.6 The COE shall be capable of including or excluding access to each object on a per user and on a per group basis.  
3.2.4.9 The COE shall provide a means to associate definable sets of applications with a work environment (e.g., sessions) and assign multiple work environments to users on a per-user basis.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Use one of the following commands to obtain a list of all the users in the "/etc/passwd" file:  lpr /etc/passwd or cat /etc/passwd	Depending on the command used, a list of all users on the system will be displayed on screen or printed.	Print /etc/passwd if a printer is available, otherwise just view the file using the "cat" command.	
2	Edit the group file to ensure that all the users are assigned to a group.  vi /etc/group	The /etc/group file will have a list of groups followed by a list of users on the system. Every user must belong to at least one group, and each user may be in more than one group.	The object is to make sure each user is assigned a group.	
3	Check that all applications loaded on the system have a group assigned to them.			

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** DAC TCSEC Requirements

**Test Objective 270** Verify that the Operating System was designed to satisfy the C2 level of trust as defined by the TCSEC.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Produce the System and Network Administration manual for Solaris; turn to Appendix D and verify that Solaris was designed to meet the Discretionary Access Control requirements of the C2 level of trust as defined in the TCSEC "Orange Book."	The System and Network Administration manual shows that Solaris was designed to meet the requirements of the C2 level of trust as defined in the "Orange Book."		
2	Determine if formal certification has been received.			

**Topic:** DAC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 257** Verify that permissions on all "temp" directories are set correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Obtain a list of all temp directories on the system. A temp directory is any directory that is used to write scratch files. The main temp directories for Solaris 2.5.1 include: /tmp and /var/tmp /usr/tmp. Use the following command to check the permissions on any temp directories:  ls -l <temp dir name>	Output similar to the following should be displayed:  drwxrwxrwt 5 sys sys 846 Apr 15 13:11.	Note: The last character in the permissions, execute permission for "other", should be a "t", signifying that the sticky bit is set. If it is not set, execute the following command: "chmod +t <dir name>". Recheck the permissions on the directory.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** IFS Variable

**Test Objective 81** Verify the shell used on the system resets the Internal Field Separator (IFS) variable when invoked.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The Internal Field Separator (IFS) variable can be set to indicate what characters separate input words. Most modern versions of the shell will reset their IFS value to a normal set of characters when invoked. Thus, shell files will behave properly. However, not all do (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

Bourne shell inherits the value of its internal field separator from its environment. This can be used to obtain root access. In the Bourne shell, the IFS is the ASCII character used as a separator on the command line between command names and arguments. Normally the IFS is set to space or tab, but it can also be set by the user from environment variables. In UNIX, environmental variables are passed to child processes. The C library call popen(3) uses the Bourne shell and inherits the environment variables, including IFS. Because of this, the path passed to popen(3) can be altered so that an alternate program is executed. This means a setuid root program which uses popen(3) can be forced to run a program other than what it is intended to run.

If a root program does "popen("/bin/mail" ...)", and the IFS is set to " / ", then it runs the program "bin" with the command argument of "mail" and a userid of root. "/usr/lib/ex3.7preserve" is one of many programs you can use to exploit this. When "vi(1)" receives a hangup signal or when the command "p- reserve" is used, it executes the program "/usr/lib/ex3.7preserve", which preserves the current file you were editing and sends mail to you notifying you that your file was saved. To make certain it has permission to do this, "ex3.7 preserve" runs setuid to root. The security problem arises because when ex3.7 preserve tries to send mail to the user, it uses popen(3) to run "/bin/mail".

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As an unprivileged user, insert the following text into a file named "ifs_test":  #!/bin/sh # A test of the shell cd /tmp cat > tmp << E-O-F echo "Security Vulnerability. Your shell does NOT reset the IFS variable!" E-O-F  cat > foo << E-O-F	Script file exists.	SUID and SGID scripts should NEVER be used.	

	<pre> echo "Your shell appears well behaved." E-O-F  cat &gt; test\$\$ &lt;&lt;E-O-F /tmp/foo E-O-F  chmod 700 tmp foo test\$\$  PATH=.:\$PATH IFS=/ export PATH IFS  test\$\$  rm -f tmp foo test\$\$  THEN execute the following commands: chmod 700 ifs_test ifs_test </pre>			
2	<p>As an unprivileged user, execute the following commands:</p> <pre> user1&gt;chmod 700 ifs_test user1&gt;ifs_test </pre>	Output other than "Your shell appears well behaved" indicates that the IFS variable does not get reset and under no condition should SUID or SGID scripts be used.	SUID and SGID scripts should NEVER be used.	
3	<p>Attempt to exploit IFS by executing the following commands:</p> <pre> # cat &gt;~/bin/bin #!/bin/sh sh -i ^D  # chmod 755 /bin/bin # setenv IFS / # cd /bin # /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule /sys/sun4c/OBJ/evqmod-sun4c.o /etc/openwin/modules/evqload # whoami </pre>	The output should indicate that the user is NOT root.	SUID and SGID scripts should NEVER be used.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Path

**Test Objective 87** Verify root's search path is correct.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** A search path should never contain the current directory. This is especially true of the superuser account. More generally, a search path should never include a directory that is writeable by other users.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root execute the following commands:  #echo \$PATH  OR  review the root search path found in the /.profile, /.cshrc, and /.login files.	Root's search path does not include the current directory (specified by a ".").		
2	As root, execute the following command:  ls -ldb `echo \$PATH   sed 's:/ /g`	None of the directories in the search path should be world writeable.		

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 66** Ensure the file systems are configured correctly and securely.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command and review the output:  # df -t	The file system should be appropriately partitioned so that no filesystem is approaching 100% full.		



**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 70** Verify root's startup files are only writeable by root.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Various programs have methods of automatic initialization to set options and variables for the user. All startup files should be protected so only the user can write to them. It is particularly important that the startup files the superuser uses files that are not writeable by others.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>As root, execute the following commands from root's home directory and verify from the output that the files listed are writeable only by root:</p> <pre>#ls -ldb /.login #ls -ldb /.profile #ls -ldb /etc/profile #ls -ldb /.cshrc #ls -ldb /.kshrc #ls -ldb /.emacs #ls -ldb /.exrc #ls -ldb /.forward #ls -ldb /.rhosts #ls -ldb /.dtprofile #ls -ldb /.Xdefaults</pre>	Permissions of existing files is 600 or 400 and are owned by root.	Depending on the system configuration, ALL of the files listed in "Required Actions" MAY NOT exist. The base operating system does not install with the listed files present, and the existence of any one of these files indicates an addition of the file by the System Administrator.	
2	<p>As root, execute the following commands from root's home directory to VIEW the files listed below. Also, on any executable that is referenced in the file being viewed execute the "ls -ldb" command to check the permissions of the file.</p> <pre>#/usr/ucb/more /.login #/usr/ucb/more /.profile #/usr/ucb/more /etc/profile #/usr/ucb/more /.cshrc #/usr/ucb/more /.kshrc #/usr/ucb/more /.emacs #/usr/ucb/more /.exrc #/usr/ucb/more /.forward #/usr/ucb/more /.dtprofile #/usr/ucb/more /.Xdefaults</pre>	Permissions of all files referenced in the listed files are 600 or 400 and are owned by root.		

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 72** Verify all root executable files are owned by root and are not world or group writeable.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** System Administrators should be trained to type in full pathname of files to be executed and to ensure that any executable that is not located in a protected directory is safe to execute.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following commands:  #ls -lgdb /etc /usr /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/5bin	Listed directories are owned by root and are not world or group writeable.	All executables run by root should be located in a directory where every directory in the path is owned by root and is not group or world writeable. In particular, the following directories should not be group or world writeable: /bin, /etc, /usr/sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/5bin, /usr/ucb. System Administrators should be trained to type in full pathname of files to be executed and to ensure that any executable that is not located in the protected directories listed above are safe to execute.	
2	As root, execute the following commands:  #find /etc -user root \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) ! -type l \-exec ls -lgdb {} \; #find /usr/bin -user root \( -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) \-type l -exec ls -lgdb {} \; #find /usr/sbin -user root \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) ! -type l \-exec ls -lgdb {} \; #find /usr/5bin -user root \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) ! -type l \-exec ls -lgdb {} \;	There should be no files listed indicating that there are no world/group writeable root owned files.	All executables run by root should be owned by root and all executables run by root should not be world or group writeable.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 78** Identify all world-writeable files on the system and verify their need for world-write access.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** World-writeable files, directories, and devices represent a potential security hole in a system. It is important to periodically identify them and verify the need for world-write access. Notable files that may be world-writeable include: /tmp, /usr/tmp, and /dev/tty\* (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following commands:  # /bin/find / -type f \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -lgb { } \;  # /bin/find / -type d \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -lgdb { } \;	There are no unexpected world writeable files or directories on your system. Files should be world-writeable only if there is a legitimate requirement.  COPS, Tiger, SPI all provide checking of file permissions.	The following files and directories may safely remain world-writeable:  /tmp and contents /var/tmp and contents /var/preserve /var/mail (and many more...)	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 79** Verify that all world-readable, but not world or group writeable, non-setuid/setgid system files and directories are owned by root. (see rationale)

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Many systems ship files and directories owned by bin (or sys). This varies from system to system and may have serious security implications.

CHANGE all non-setuid files and all non-setgid files and directories that are world readable but not world or group writeable and that are owned by bin to ownership of root, with group id 0 (wheel group under SunOS 4.1.x).

Please note that under Solaris 2.x changing ownership of system files can cause warning messages during installation of patches and system packages. Anything else should be verified with the vendor.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  /usr/bin/find / -perm -4 ! \ ( -perm \ -6022 \ ) \ ( -type f -o -type d \ ) \ ! -user root -group 0 -exec \ ls -lgdb { } \ ;	Any output from this command indicates a file or directory that does not meet the criteria listed in the rationale and should be investigated carefully.	Use of a tool such as Tiger, COPS, or SPI would be very useful and save work.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 82** Verify the startup and shutdown scripts are valid and protected.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  /bin/find /etc \( -perm -2 -o \ -perm -20 \) -exec ls -ld {} \;	There should be no output indicating that the /etc directory and its contents are not group or world writeable.		
2	Review all startup and shutdown scripts and configuration files. These scripts are located in the /etc/init.d directory.	Any task performed in the startup script is performed securely. Any service started or task performed is approved. Any directory that contains a script, executable, or configuration file that is executed in the rc scripts during bootup and shutdown is not writeable by a user other than root.	Note: The startup files can be found in the "/etc/rc?.d" directories. The startup files in these directories are hard links to the files in /etc/init.d. The "/etc/rc?" files are scripts used to run the executables located in the "/etc/rc?.d" directories. There is no need to check them.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 85** Identify the SUID and SGID files on the system and verify their need for SUID and SGID privilege.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** SUID and SGID files allow an unprivileged user to accomplish tasks that require privileges. When a SUID program is run, its effective UID becomes that of the user who created the program, rather than the user who is running it. When a SGID program runs, its effect GID becomes that of the creating user.

Shell scripts that have the setuid or setgid bits set on them are not secure, regardless of how many safeguards are taken when writing them. Setuid and setgid shell scripts should never be allowed on any UNIX system (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  #/bin/find / -type f \( -perm \-4000 -o -perm -2000 \) \-exec ls -lgdb { } \;	Verify that all of the programs listed as output should be SUID or SGID. Only authorized files should be SUID or SGID.	Depending on the system configuration, the output may be lengthy. It may be easier to review if the output is piped to a file, which can then be printed and reviewed. There are a large number (about 90) SUID and SGID programs that are installed as part of Solaris 2.4. Tools such as COPS, Tiger, and SPI report SUID and SGID programs.	

<b>Topic:</b>	FILE SYS SEC
<b>Subtopic:</b>	Permissions
<b>Test Objective 86</b>	Determine if users can "give away" files, and if so, if they can "give away" an SUID file to root.
<b>DII COE SRS Requirement:</b>	3.2.4.4 The COE shall provide controls to limit the propagation of access rights.
<b>Rationale:</b>	<p>The last defense against system crackers are the permissions offered by the file system. Each file or directory has three sets of permission bits associated with it: one set for the user who owns the file, one set for the users in the group with which the file is associated, and one set for all other users (the "world" permissions). Each set contains three identical permission bits, which control the following (Curry, 1990):</p> <p>read - If set, the file or directory may be read. In the case of a directory, read access allows a user to see the contents of a directory (the names of the files contained therein), but not to access them.</p> <p>write - If set, the file or directory may be written (modified). In the case of a directory, write permission implies the ability to create, delete, and rename files. Note that the ability to remove a file is not controlled by the permissions on the file, but rather the permissions on the directory containing the file.</p> <p>execute - If set, the file or directory may be executed (searched). In the case of a directory, execute permission implies the ability to access files contained in that directory.</p> <p>In addition, a fourth permission bit is available in each set of permissions. This bit has a different meaning in each set of permission bits:</p> <p>setuid - If set in the owner permissions, this bit controls the "set user id" (setuid) status of a file. Setuid status means that when a program is executed, it executes with the permissions of the user owning the program, in addition to the permission of the user executing the program. This bit is meaningless on nonexecutable files.</p> <p>setgid - If set in the group permissions, this bit controls the "set group id" (setgid) status of a file. This behaves in exactly the same way as the setuid bit, except that the group id is affected instead. This bit is meaningless on non-executable files (but see below).</p> <p>sticky - If set in the world permissions, the "sticky" bit tells the operating system to do special things with the text image of an executable file. It is mostly a hold-over from older versions of UNIX, and has little if any use today. This bit is also meaningless on nonexecutable files (but see below).</p> <p>Under some versions of UNIX, users can run the chown command to change the ownership of a file that they own to that of any other user on the system, allowing them to "give away the file."</p>

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>As an unprivileged user, execute the following commands:</p> <pre>%touch test %ls -lg test %chown root test %ls -lg test %chmod 4755 test %ls -lg test %chown root test %ls -lg test</pre>	<p>Each attempt to change the owner to root should result in an error message of "Permission denied". Output should be similar to the following:</p> <pre>user&gt;touch test user&gt;ls -lg test -rw----- 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:30 test user&gt;chown root test chown: test: Not owner user&gt;chmod 4755 test user&gt;ls -lg test -rwsr-xr-x 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:30 test* user&gt;chown root test chown: test: Not owner user&gt;ls -lg test -rwsr-xr-x 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:30 test* user&gt;rm test user&gt;</pre>	<p>A general user should not be able to change the ownership of an SUID or SGID file (or any file) to any other user especially root.</p>	
2	<p>As an unprivileged user, execute the following commands:</p> <pre>%touch test %ls -lg test %chgrp root test %ls -lg test %chmod 2755 test %ls -lg test %chown root test %ls -lg test</pre>	<p>Each attempt to change the group to root should result in an error message of "Permission denied". Output should be similar to the following:</p> <pre>user1&gt;touch test user1&gt;ls -lg test -rw----- 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:41 test user1&gt;chgrp root test chgrp: test: Not owner user1&gt;ls -lg test -rw----- 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:41 test user1&gt;chmod 2755 test user1&gt;ls -lg test -rwxr-sr-x 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:41 test* user1&gt;chgrp root test chgrp: test: Not owner user1&gt;ls -lg test -rwxr-sr-x 1 mls rg021 0 Oct 21 09:41 test* user1&gt;rm test user1&gt;</pre>	<p>A general user should not be able to change the group of an SUID or SGID file (or any file) to any other group especially root.</p>	



**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Unauthorized Device Files

**Test Objective 75** Ensure no unauthorized device files are present on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The system's disks should be periodically scanned for unauthorized device files.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  #/bin/find / \( -type c -o -type b \) -exec ls -lgdb {} \;   \grep -v "/dev/"   grep -v "/devices/"	There are no unexpected special files outside the /dev directory.	Any device outside the /dev and /devices directory should be viewed with GREAT suspicion.  NOTE: ncheck locates SUID files also. The -s parameter of the ncheck command displays special files and files with set-user-ID mode. This parameter can be used to discover concealed violations of security policy. The ncheck command would be run as root and executed as follows:  #/etc/ncheck -s	
2	As root, execute the following command:  /bin/find /dev ! \( -type l \ -o -type c -o -type b \) \ -exec ls -lgdb {} \;	All files in /dev and /devices are special files.		
3	As root, execute the following command:  #/bin/find / \( -type c -o \ -type b \) ! -user root \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;	There are no special device files owned by root that should not be owned by root.	Any device outside the /dev and /devices directory not owned by root and should be viewed with even GREATER suspicion.	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Vulnerability - Expreserve

**Test Objective 83** Verify that the expreserve executable is secure.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>Type in the following commands:</p> <pre>#showrev -p #find / -name "*preserve*" \ -exec ls -lgdb {} \;</pre> <p>Check to see if the expreserve executable is setuid root. If not, the following procedure won't work:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cd into to your home directory.</li> <li>Create a file called "bin" containing the following lines: <pre># (IFS= should be followed by a single space then return) IFS=' ' cp /bin/sh /the/path/to/your/home/directory/xyzy chmod 4755 xyzy</pre> </li> <li>After saving the file (and exiting the editor) Type: <pre>% chmod 755 bin % /bin/sh</pre> </li> <li>From this Bourne shell, type: <pre>IFS=/ vi</pre> </li> <li>You should be in vi. Type "a" (return) and then type a couple of lines of random text into the buffer.</li> <li>Type: &lt;Escape&gt; :preserve</li> <li>Next exit the editor using the command:</li> </ol>	<p>The expreserve patch (ID = 102756-01) has been installed or the date shown for the file is after July 1993. This patch is not on the "Sun recommended" patchlist.</p> <p>There should not be a setuid root Bourne shell in your home directory. If the ex command ":preserve" fails, instead you can run a shell from within vi with the command ":shell", from the shell get the pid of the editor and kill it with a hangup signal.</p>	<p>Removal of executable permission will protect the system from this vulnerability, but will also mean that users who edit their files with either vi(1) or ex(1) and have their sessions interrupted, will not be able to recover their lost work. If the above workaround id implemented, please advise the users to regularly save their editing sessions.</p>	

	<p>&lt;Escape&gt; :wq</p> <p>h. Enter the command:</p> <p>% ls -l xyzzy</p>			
2	<p>Check to see if the expreserve executable is setuid root. If not, the following procedure won't work:</p> <p>a. cd into the test working directory.</p> <p>b. Create a file called "bin" containing the following lines:</p> <pre># (IFS= should be followed by a single space then return) IFS=' ' cp /bin/sh ./xyzzy chmod 4755 ./xyzzy</pre> <p>c. After saving the file (and exiting the editor) Type:</p> <pre>% chmod 755 bin % /bin/sh</pre> <p>d. From this Bourne shell, type:</p> <pre>IFS=/ vi</pre> <p>e. You should be in vi. Type "a" (return) and then type a couple of lines of random text into the buffer.</p> <p>f. Type: &lt;Escape&gt; :preserve</p> <p>g. Next exit the editor using the command:</p> <p>&lt;Escape&gt; :wq</p> <p>h. Enter the command:</p> <p>% ls -l xyzzy</p>	<p>There should not be a setuid root Bourne shell in the test working directory. If the ex command ":preserve" fails, instead you can run a shell from within vi with the command ":shell", from the shell get the pid of the editor and kill it with a hangup signal.</p>	<p>Removal of executable permission will protect the system from this vulnerability, but will also mean that users who edit their files with either vi(1) or ex(1) and have their sessions interrupted, will not be able to recover their lost work. If the above workaround is implemented, please advise the users to regularly save their editing sessions.</p>	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** IP forwarding

**Test Objective 290** Verify that IP source routing has been disabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  # ndd /dev/ip ip_forwarding	IP forwarding should be disabled (i.e., value of 0).	The ndd command gets and sets selected configuration parameters in TCP/IP Internet protocol family kernel drivers (ndd man page).	

**Topic:** FILE SYS SEC

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 260** Verify that permissions on the backup program are set correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  ls -l /usr/lib/fs/ufs/ufsdump	Output similar to the following should be displayed:  -r-sr-sr-x 1 root tty 156856 May 2 1996 ufsdump	Only the "user" and "group" sticky bits should be set.	

**Topic:** HARDWARE/FIRMWARE

**Subtopic:** Boot Password

**Test Objective 184** Verify the single user boot or system firmware password is set, and the system is configured such that a password must be entered to boot to a single-user state.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.12.3 The COE shall be configured such that a password must be entered to boot to a single-user state.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  #eeprom security-mode	The EEPROM configuration parameters are set to a security-mode other than none (Preferably Full) as shown below.  # eeprom security-mode security-mode=full #	<p>The eeprom command displays or changes the values of parameters in the EEPROM. It processes parameters in the order given. When processing a parameter accompanied by a value, eeprom makes the indicated alteration to the EEPROM; otherwise it displays the parameter's value. When given no parameter specifiers, eeprom displays the values of all EEPROM parameters. Only the super-user may alter the EEPROM contents.</p> <p>The following EEPROM parameters have security significance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- security-#badlogins: Contains the number of incorrect security password attempts to the firmware.</li><li>- security-mode: Contains the firmware security level (options: none, command, or full). If set to command or full, the system will prompt the user for a PROM security password. The default setting is none.</li></ul>	

			- security-password: Contains the firmware security password (never displayed). The password can be set only when the security-mode is set to command or full.	
2	<p>Halt the system. When the machine is halted, attempt to reboot into single user mode with the following command:</p> <p>&gt;boot &lt;disk&gt; -s</p> <p>OR depending on the machine architecture:</p> <p>&gt;b &lt;disk&gt; -s</p>	The user should be challenged for the eeprom password when booting into single-user mode.		

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Accounts

**Test Objective 98** Verify there are no accounts on the system that have not been used within a reasonable amount of time.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in and run the following script to determine which users have not logged in within the last month:  #!/bin/sh date uname -a PATH=/bin:/usr/bin;export PATH umask 077 THIS_MONTH=`date   awk '{print \$2}'` /bin/last   /bin/grep \ \$THIS_MONTH   \ awk '{print \$1}'   sort -u > users1\$\$  cat /etc/passwd   \ /bin/awk -F: '{print \$1}'   \ /bin/sort -u > users2\$\$ /bin/comm -13 users[12]\$\$ /bin/rm -f users[12]\$\$	No USER login account names should be returned. If any user names are returned these should be considered dormant accounts and should be disabled or deleted.		



**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Accounts

**Test Objective 100** Verify there are no duplicate GIDs.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>If running NIS execute the following command:</p> <pre># /bin/nisecat group.org_dir</pre> <p>OR if NOT running NIS execute the following command:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/more /etc/group</pre> <p>Verify there are no duplicate GIDS and that appropriate users belong to the system groups.</p>	There should not be duplicate GIDs.	<p>Group ids must be distinct integers between 0 and 32,767. If the environment is networked, users should have the same unique UID across the entire network. GID 0 is generally reserved for the groups "root" or "wheel" and GID 1 is reserved for the group "daemon".</p> <p>If the RUNNING NIS command is used on a non NIS running machine, the following output is produced:</p> <pre># /bin/nisecat passwd.org_dir passwd.org_dir: NIS+ servers unreachable. #</pre>	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 97** Verify I&A mechanisms are configured for secure operation.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Enter a valid user ID and invalid password at the login prompt.	"Login incorrect" message is displayed on the screen. The host login prompt is redisplayed on the screen.		
2	Enter an invalid user ID and valid password at the login prompt.	"Login incorrect" message is displayed on the screen. The login prompt is redisplayed on the screen.		
3	Enter an invalid user ID and invalid password at the login prompt.	"Login incorrect" message is displayed on the screen. The login prompt is redisplayed on the screen.		
4	Attempt two additional invalid logins.	A "Login incorrect" message is displayed on the screen after each invalid login attempt. After the final attempt, the "REPEATED LOGIN FAILURES" message is displayed on the screen. (This message may take several minutes to display). Note this information is logged as well to the file /var/adm/messages.	If a window manager is not running, the message may be logged to /var/adm/loginlog if that file has been created.	
5	Attempt to log in as root.	The "NOT ON SYSTEM CONSOLE" message is displayed on the screen.		
6	The test account supplies valid user ID and valid password at the login prompt.	The user is logged into the host.		
7	The test account logs out of the host.	The host login prompt is displayed on the screen.		
8	Administrator/Superuser logs into the host and assumes root by using the su to root command by using the su to root command.	The host system prompt is displayed on the screen.		
9	As an Administrator/Superuser display user authentication data in the /etc/shadow file using the following command:  /usr/ucb/more /etc/shadow	User identification and authentication data is displayed on the screen. Users are uniquely identified and passwords are encrypted.	Not all users are in the /etc/shadow due to NIS/NIS+	
10	As an Administrator/Superuser display the permissions for the /etc/shadow file using the following command:  ls -ld /etc/shadow	Permissions for the /etc/shadow file are 600 and the owner is root showing that access to this file is limited to the owner (root). Note: Permissions on this file can also be set to 400 (more restrictive than 600).		

11	Administrator/Supervisor logs out of the host.	The host login prompt is displayed on the screen.		
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**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Distributed Authentication Mechanism

**Test Objective 109** Verify the system supports a distributed authentication mechanism.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.1.8 The COE shall provide a distributed authentication mechanism.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  pkginfo grep SUNWnis	A list of two pkgs will be listed.	If no output is returned from the command, then the nis software needs to be loaded and then configured to run.	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Login

**Test Objective 107** Verify the system prohibits direct login as a trusted user (e.g., root). Also verify the system requires trusted users to change their effective userID to gain access to root (e.g., su) and to reauthenticate before requesting access to privileged functions.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:**

3.2.1.1.2 The COE shall prohibit direct login as a trusted user (e.g., the root user, or super user, etc.).

3.2.1.1.3 The COE shall provide the capability for trusted users to gain access to root through a process of changing their effective user identifier (userID) (e.g., su to root).

3.2.1.1.4 The COE shall require trusted users to re-authenticate before requesting access to functions that require system privileges.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the following file:  /etc/default/login	<p>The following line should be uncommented in the /etc/default/login file:</p> <p>CONSOLE=/dev/console</p> <p>This ensures that root can only log in at the system console, not from any remote terminal.</p> <p>The file /etc/default/login is owned by root.</p> <p>The file /etc/default/login has permissions 644.</p>	<p>An entry in the file /etc/default/login determines the root access restrictions. If the following command appears in the file, then root access is restricted to the console:</p> <p>CONSOLE=/dev/console</p> <p>Any user who tries to remotely log into the system must first login to his account, and then use the su command to become root. (Security, Performance, and Accounting Administration)</p>	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Password Management

**Test Objective 1** Verify all passwords transferred across the network are protected.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.1.6 If a COE component transfers a user's password across a network to another COE component, the password shall be protected.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	The only real method of testing this is through the use of a sniffer!!!			

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Password Management

**Test Objective 105** Verify the system enforces individual user accountability, a globally-unique valid userID and password is required for all users to access the system, and the user's identity is associated with all auditable actions performed.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.1.1 The COE shall enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each individual system user.  
3.2.1.1.1 The COE shall require users to identify themselves before beginning to perform any actions that the system is expected to mediate.  
3.2.1.2 Each user shall be identified by a globally unique user name or userID that will follow a standard set of processes or rules for formation.  
3.2.1.3 The COE shall provide the capability of associating the user's identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.

**Rationale:** Simply put, accounts without passwords should not be allowed on any system. An account without a password is an easy target for an intruder and subjects the entire system to risk.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root execute the following command:  # logins -p	There should be no output from this command. This indicates that all accounts have passwords.  NOTE: If a password of <return> is assigned by root, this test does not work as the password field in /etc/shadow contains a value for the password. The only remedy for this is a dictionary search.	The logins -p command provides a list of login accounts that have no passwords. The output of this command can be used to make sure that all users on the system have a password.	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Password Management

**Test Objective 106** Verify the installation-provided userIDs do not have default passwords.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Several accounts come pre-installed on a computer system. (For example, on a UNIX system, these accounts are normally at the beginning of the /etc/passwd file and have names like bin, lib, uucp, and news.) Either disable these accounts or change their passwords (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Attempt to log into each of the following IDs with its default password:  Userid: guest Password: guest  Userid: root Password: root  Userid: system Password: manager	The default passwords should not be valid for the accounts.	After installation be sure to change all default passwords, lock the account, or delete the account.  COPS, Tiger, and SPI check for common default passwords.	



**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Password Management

**Test Objective 112** Verify that the default password expiration and minimum password length are set appropriately.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.1.4.2 Password life shall be limited to a maximum of 180 days. The COE shall notify the user prior to password expiration.

**Rationale:** Some systems allow the system administrator to set a "lifetime" for passwords. Users whose passwords are older than the time allowed are forced to change their passwords the next time they log in. If a user's password is exceptionally old, the system may prevent the user from logging in altogether.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the following file:  /etc/default/passwd	The following parameters should be set to appropriate values:  MAXWEEKS=24 MINWEEKS= PASSLENGTH=	The minimum password lifetime, maximum password lifetime, and minimum password length are defined in /etc/default/passwd. (passwd man page)	
2	To determine the password aging set for individual users, execute the following command:  # logins -x	Password aging should be set appropriately.	The -x option of the logins command prints an extended set of information about each selected user. The extended information includes home directory, login shell and password aging information, each displayed on a separate line. The password information consists of password status (PS for password, NP for no password or LK for locked). If the login is passworded, status is followed by the date the password was last changed, the number of days required between changes, and the number of days allowed before a change is required. The password aging information shows the time interval that the user will receive a password expiration	

			warning message (when logging on) before the password expires.	
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**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** I&A TCSEC Requirements

**Test Objective 271** Verify that the Operating System was designed to satisfy the C2 level of trust as defined by the TCSEC.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review Solaris SHIELD Basic Security Manual, Chapter 5; turn to the appropriate section(s) which demonstrate the ability of the NMS to satisfy the "Orange Book" requirements.	Section(s) are present in the manual which verify that the component Operating System was designed to meet the C2 requirements of the "Orange Book."		
2	Determine if formal certification has been received.	Documentation indicates that formal certification has been given.		

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Accounts

**Test Objective 99** Verify there are no duplicate UIDs.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>If running NIS, execute the following command:</p> <pre>#/bin/nisecat passwd.org_dir</pre> <p>OR if NOT running NIS execute the following command:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/more /etc/passwd</pre> <p>Verify that there are no duplicate UIDs.</p>	<p>There should not be duplicate UIDs. If there are duplicate UIDs, the accounts should be disabled.</p>	<p>User ids must be distinct integers between 0 and 32,767. If the environment is networked, users should have the same unique UID across the entire network. Root uses UID 0, Bin uses UID 1, and Daemon uses UID 2. In addition, it is customary to use the lower UIDs for non-human logins (i.e., UUCP). It is not recommended to re-use UIDs after a user account is deleted.</p>	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Accounts

**Test Objective 103** Verify site identifying information is stored for all user accounts on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	If NOT running NIS, browse the /etc/passwd file using the following command:  #/usr/bin/vi /etc/passwd  OR if running NIS, use the following command:  #/bin/niscat passwd.org_dir	The fifth field should be filled in with relevant data (i.e., full user name and user location).	If the running NIS command is used on a non NIS running machine, the following output is produced:  # /bin/niscat passwd.org_dir passwd.org_dir: NIS+ servers unreachable. #	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Accounts

**Test Objective 102** Verify there are no guest accounts on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Guest accounts present a security hole. By their nature, these accounts are rarely used, some are always used by people who should only have access to the machine for the short period of time that they are guests. The most secure way to handle guest accounts is to install them on an as-needed basis, and delete them as soon as the people using them leave. Guest accounts should never be given simple passwords such as "guest" or "visitor," and should never be allowed to remain in the password file when they are not being used (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	If NOT running NIS, browse the /etc/passwd file to determine if there is a guest account using the following command:  #/usr/bin/vi /etc/passwd  OR if running NIS, determine if there is a guest account on the system by executing the following command:  #/bin/nisecat passwd.org_dir	Guest accounts should not exist.	If a Guest account is present and has been approved for use, the Guest account should not have a trivial password. Try logging into the account using simple passwords such as "guest" and "visitor".	

**Topic:** I&A

**Subtopic:** Password Management

**Test Objective 71** Ensure authentication data is protected from being accessed by unauthorized users.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.1.5 The COE shall protect authentication data from being accessed by unauthorized users.

**Rationale:** It is no longer considered secure to place even encrypted passwords in the world-readable /etc/passwd file. As a result, numerous vendors have introduced shadow password files. These files have the same encrypted passwords, but the passwords are stored in special files that cannot be read by most users on the system (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	ls -ld /etc/shadow	<p>The following permissions are displayed:</p> <p>-r----- root sys /etc/shadow</p>		

**Topic:** Markings

**Subtopic:** Login Warning

**Test Objective 6** Verify a security warning is displayed prior to the login process indicating restrictions that apply to logins, the highest classification of information processed on the system, and that misuse is subject to applicable penalties.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.7.1 The COE shall display a security warning prior to the login process that indicates the highest classification of information processed on the system and that misuse is subject to applicable penalties.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Prior to login view the monitor. Review the /etc/motd file and verify that the text in the file contains the text that is the site approved warning to users logging on the system.	A security warning is displayed prior to the login process indicating restrictions that apply to logins, the highest classification of information processed on the system, and that misuse is subject to applicable penalties.	DII COE does not use /etc/motd.	



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** .netrc files

**Test Objective 43** Verify netrc files are not used.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root execute the following command:  #/bin/find / -name .netrc \ -exec ls -ld {} \; -exec more {} \;	Any output indicates the existence of a .netrc file on the system. The file path, permissions and contents are listed. There should NOT be any output from this command.	The .netrc file should not exist on a secure system.  If the responsible security officer has approved the use of .netrc files for a specific purpose: Do not store password information in .netrc files. Set Permissions on .netrc files to disallow read and write access by group and world ( i.e., 600).	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** .rhost files

**Test Objective 115** Determine if any rhost files are used on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The .rhosts file is similar in concept and format to the hosts.equiv file, but allows trusted access only to specific host-user combinations, rather than to hosts in general. Each user may create a .rhosts file in his home directory, and allow access to his account without a password. Most people use this mechanism to allow trusted access between accounts they have on systems owned by different organizations that do not trust each other's hosts in hosts.equiv. Unfortunately, this file presents a major security problem: while hosts.equiv is under the system administrator's control and can be managed effectively, any user may create a .rhosts file granting access to whomever he chooses, without the system administrator's knowledge (Curry, 1990).

The only secure way to manage .rhosts files is to completely disallow them on the system. The system administrator should check the system often for violations of this policy (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  #/bin/find / -name .rhosts \ -exec ls -ldb {} \; -exec more {} \;	There should be no output from this command. Output means that a .rhosts file has been found. Users should not have a .rhosts file.	Cron should be used to periodically check for, report the contents of, and remove .rhosts files.  If there is a genuine need for .rhosts files (e.g., running backups over a network unattended) and their use has been approved by responsible security officer:  the first character of any .rhosts file is not "-".  The permissions of all .rhosts files are set to 600  The owner of each .rhosts file is the account's owner  No .rhosts file contains the symbol "+" on any line  Usage of netgroups within	

			<p>.rhosts does not allow unintended access to this account</p> <p>.rhosts files do not use '!' or '#'</p>	
--	--	--	--	--

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Address Configuration

**Test Objective 113** Verify Subnet addresses are appropriately configured.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review: /etc/netmasks.	The correct subnet definitions must be obtained from the local network administrator.		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Anonymous FTP

**Test Objective 134** Determine whether anonymous FTP is enabled on the system. If anonymous FTP is enabled, verify that it has been securely configured.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Anonymous FTP allows users who do not have an account on a machine to have restricted access in order to transfer from a specific directory. Because the anonymous FTP feature allows anyone to access the system (albeit in a very limited way), it should not be made available on every host on the network. If anonymous ftp is required, one machine should be chosen (preferably a server or standalone host) on which to allow this service. (Curry, 1990)

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	To ascertain whether you are running anonymous ftp, try to connect to the localhost using anonymous ftp. Be sure to give an RFC822-compliant username (e.g., mcguire@ncr.disa.mil) as the password. Type the following commands to ascertain whether anonymous ftp is enabled:  % ftp <hostname> name (localhost:ldname): anonymous	If the error message "530 User anonymous unknown" is returned then anonymous ftp is disabled. NOTE: If this is the case, do not complete the rest of the steps for this test. If the system instead replies with the string "331 Guest login ok" and then prompts for a password, anonymous ftp access is enabled and the rest of the test steps should be completed.	Anonymous ftp should not be enabled unless there is a legitimate business need.	
2	To determine if anonymous ftp is securely configured, verify that the ftp account has been created and has been disabled by placing an asterisk (*) in the password field. Verify that the account has been given a special home directory, such as /usr/ftp or /usr/spool/ftp.			
3	Verify that the ftp owns its home directory and that it is unwriteable by anyone.			
4	Verify that the directory ftp/bin is owned by the super-user and unwriteable by anyone. Verify that a copy of the ls program is in this directory.			
5	Verify that the directory ftp/etc is owned by the super-user and unwriteable by anyone. Verify that copies of the password and group files are in this directory, with all the			

	(*). Note that the only account that must be present is "ftp."  Verify that the directory ftp/pub is owned by "ftp" and world-writeable.			
6	Verify that the directory ftp/pub is owned by "ftp" and world-writeable.			

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** FTP

**Test Objective 136** Verify the FTP users file contains the appropriate accounts.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The /etc/ftpusers file contains a list of the users who are not allowed to use FTP to access any files. This file should contain all accounts that are not used by actual users.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following commands:  ls -lg /etc/ftpusers more /etc/ftpusers	The permissions do not allow group/world write and the file is owned by root. Typical accounts that should be included are uucp, news, bin, ingress, news, nobody, daemon, and root.	The ftpusers file should contain a list of users who are not allowed access to the system using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). If this file is missing, the list of users is considered to be empty, so that any user may use FTP to access the system if the other criteria for access are met.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Mail Aliases

**Test Objective 32** Verify the "decode" and "uudecode" aliases have been removed from the aliases file (/etc/aliases or /usr/lib/aliases).

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  #vi /etc/aliases  Search for decode by typing "/decode" and press return.	A message should be printed to the bottom of the window as follows:  Pattern not found  OR the decode alias line appears as follows:  #decode: "/usr/bin/uudecode"	After modifying the /etc/aliases file the /etc/newaliases executable must be executed.	



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Network Services

**Test Objective 41** Verify the network services are appropriately configured and defined.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Verify that the network services are configured securely by browsing the /etc/inetd.conf file using the following command:  #/usr/bin/vi /etc/inetd.conf	Unnecessary network services should be disabled.  A "#" starts each line identifying a disabled service. Verify that the following services are disabled: name, shell, login, exec, comsat, talk, uucp, finger, systat, netstat, admind, rquotad, rusersd, sprayd, walld, rstatd, rexd, rpc.cmsd, and rpc.ttdbserverd.	Services to be disabled include:  - name: obsolete name server protocol - shell: allows remote user via rsh to run processes on this system - login: allows remote user via rlogin - exec: allows remote users access via rexec - comsat: real-time intrusive notification to users that mail has arrived - talk: remote chat protocol - uucp: UNIX-to-UNIX copy over TCP - finger: remote access to local user information - systat: allows remote users to view the process table - netstat: allows remote users to view the list of active network connections - admind: allows remote users to execute remote administrative activities - rquotad: provides disk quota information to NFS clients - rusersd: provides local user information - sprayd: allows remote users to send a stream of IP packets to the host and have them acknowledged - walld: allows remote	

			users to post messages to system users - rstatd: allows remote users to view system information such as load - rexd: obsolete remote execution server with no security - rpc.cmsd: calendar manager - rpc.ttdbserverd: tool talk database server that allows object linking. MAY BE NEEDED for DCE. - tftpd: trivial ftp server.	
2	Verify that the permissions of the /etc/inetd.conf file are correct using the following command:  #/bin/ls /etc/inetd.conf	The permissions are set to 600 and the owner is root.		
3	Use the following command to verify that only required and authorized network services are registered with the portmapper. The following command determines which services are registered with the Portmapper:  # /usr/bin/rpcinfo -p localhost	Only appropriate services are registered with portmapper. The following services are NOT listed: name, shell, login, exec, comsat, talk, uucp, finger, systat, netstat, admin, rquotad, rusersd, sprayd, walld, rstatd, rexd, rpc.cmsd, and rpc.ttdbserverd.		
4	Verify that the permissions and owner of the /etc/inet/services file are correct using the following command:  #/bin/ls /etc/inet/services	The permissions are set to 600 and the owner is root.		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** NFS

**Test Objective 76** Verify the files on the server are not world-writeable or group-writeable.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Because the NFS server maps root to nobody, you can protect files and directories on your server by setting their owner to root and making them not world-writeable or group-writeable.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the /etc/dfs/dfstab file using the following command:  #vi /etc/dfs/dfstab  and for each shared filesystem run the following command:  /bin/find filesystem \( -perm \-2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -ldg { } \;	No files should be listed.	Any lines starting with "share -F nfs" should also have "-o ro" in the same line. This is the option for "read only" and will insure that they are not "world-writeable".	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** NFS

**Test Objective 77** Ensure filesystems are mounted with the nosuid option and read-only where practical. If read-only is not practical, verify system files and user home directories are not mounted.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** In some versions of UNIX, it is possible to turn off the SUID and SGID bits on mounted filesystems by specifying the nosuid option with the mount command. If available, this option should always be specified when a filesystem is mounted unless there is an overriding reason to import SUID or SGID files from the mounted filesystem (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

One of the best ways to protect sensitive files and directories is to mount them on read-only disks. It is recommended that the following directories be mounted as read-only partitions: /, /usr/bin, /bin, /etc, /lib, /usr/lib, /usr/ucb (if it exists), /usr/include, /usr/src, /usr/etc (if it exists) (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>Browse the /etc/vfstab file using the following command:</p> <pre>#vi /etc/vfstab</pre>	<p>The flag rw should only exist if a legitimate need exists and the flag nosuid should appear.</p>	<p>Each nfs entry in the /etc/vfstab file should appear similar to the following line:</p> <pre>#device device    mount FS        fsck        mount mount #to mount to fsck    point type      pass        at boot options Exporthost:/ExportDirPath -          /mountpoint nfs        -          yes ro,bg,nosuid</pre> <p>OR if mounting the filesystem from the command line use the following command:</p> <pre>example# mount -r -o nosuid,bg serv:/usr/src /usr/src</pre>	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** NFS

**Test Objective 117** Verify the appropriate entries are in the exports file.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** NFS is a distributed database system that is designed to allow several hosts to share files over the network. One of the most common uses of NFS is to allow diskless workstations to be installed in offices, while keeping all disk storage in a central location. As distributed by Sun, NFS has no security features enabled. This means that any host on the Internet may access your files via NFS, regardless of whether you trust them or not (Curry, 1990).

Fortunately, there are several easy ways to make NFS more secure. The more commonly used methods are described in this section, and these can be used to make your files quite secure from unauthorized access via NFS. Secure NFS, introduced in SunOS Release 4.0, takes security one step further, using public-key encryption techniques to ensure authorized access (Curry, 1990).

The file `/etc/exports` is perhaps one of the most important parts of NFS configuration. This file lists which file systems are exported (made available for mounting) to other systems (Curry, 1990).

The `root=` keyword specifies the list of hosts that are allowed to have super-user access to the files in the named file system. The `access=` keyword specifies the list of hosts (separated by colons) that are allowed to mount the named file system. If no `access=` keyword is specified for a file system, any host anywhere on the network may mount that file system via NFS (Curry, 1990).

Obviously, this presents a major security problem, since anyone who can mount your file systems via NFS can then peruse them at his leisure. Thus, it is important that all file systems listed in exports have an `access=` keyword associated with them. Netgroups can also be specified (Curry, 1990).

Normally, NFS translates the super-user id to a special id called "nobody" in order to prevent a user with "root" on a remote workstation from accessing other people's files. This is good for security, but sometimes a nuisance for system administrators, since you cannot make changes to files as "root" through NFS (Curry, 1990).

The exports file also allows you to grant super-user access to certain file systems for certain hosts by using the `root=` keyword. Following this keyword, a colon-separated list of up to ten hosts may be specified (Curry, 1990).

Granting "root" access to a host should not be done lightly. If a host has "root" access to a file system, then the super-user on that host will have complete access to the file system, just as if you had given him the "root" password on the server. Untrusted hosts should never be given "root" access

to NFS file systems (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>Use the following command to ensure that file systems are correctly exported:</p> <pre>/usr/bin/vi /etc/dfs/dfstab</pre> <p>This file will not exist if the computer being tested is not an NFS server.</p>	<p>Only necessary filesystems are exported.</p> <p>Only authorized hosts are given access to the exported filesystems.</p> <p>All entries use fully qualified hostnames (Preferably an ip address).</p> <p>Filesystems are shared using "anon=-1" to disallow accesses that are not accompanied by a user ID.</p> <p>The NFS server is not self-referenced, either by name or by specification of a 'localhost' entry.</p> <p>File systems to be exported are shared as read-only, except where specifically approved by the responsible security officer.</p> <p>Only the minimum access necessary is given on the exported filesystem.</p> <p>File systems to be exported are shared non-setuid.</p> <p>The "root =" option should NOT be used.</p> <p>Access should be granted by netgroup or host.</p>	<p>Use of a network file system must be approved for use by the responsible security officer.</p> <p>All Sun-recommended NFS patches have been applied.</p> <p>Ensure that you never export file systems unintentionally to the world.</p> <p>Review periodically what you currently have exported.</p> <p>Run fsir and for all your file systems and rerun it periodically.</p> <p>Ensure that the RPC portmapper does not allow proxy requests.</p> <p>directory1 entry gives root access to client1 root. This should not be done unless absolutely necessary.</p> <p>directory2 entry gives read and write access to all hosts. This should not be done.</p> <p>directory3 entry gives read and write access to client1 and client2. Write access should be prohibited if not needed.</p> <p>directory4 entry gives read only access to client1 and client2. This is the most desirable entry.</p> <pre>#!/bin/sh share -F nfs -o- rw=client1:client2,root=cli ent1 /directory1_to_export share -F nfs -o -rw, root=client1 /directory1_to_export</pre>	

			<pre>share -F nfs -o - rw=client1:client2 /directory2_to_export share -F nfs -o ro=client1:client2 /directory3_to_export</pre>	
2	<p>Execute the following command and ensure that the owner and permissions of the dfstab file are correct:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/ls -lg /etc/dfs/dfstab</pre>	<p>The file /etc/dfs/dfstab has permissions 644.</p> <p>The file /etc/dfs/dfstab is owned by root.</p>	<p>Use of a network file system must be approved for use by the responsible security officer.</p> <p>All Sun-recommended NFS patches have been applied.</p> <p>Review periodically what you currently have exported.</p> <p>Run fsir and for all your file systems and rerun it periodically.</p> <p>Ensure that the RPC portmapper does not allow proxy requests.</p>	
3	<p>Check to see if NFS port monitoring is enabled.</p>		<p>Check to see if the line "set nfs:nfs_portmon = 1" is in the /etc/system file. If it is not, add it and reboot system. Refer to test objective 151.</p>	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration

**Test Objective 89** Determine whether rusers is enabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The UNIX rusers command displays information about accounts currently active on a remote system. This may provide an attacker with account names or other information useful in mounting an attack (CERT Advisory CA-93:14).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command from a networked host:  % rusers -a <hostname>	If the error message "<hostname>: RPC: Program not registered," then rusers is disabled. If instead, a list of user names and login information was generated, then a rusers server is running on the host.	rusers should NOT be enabled unless there is a legitimate business need.	



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration

**Test Objective 90** Determine whether rexd is enabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The UNIX remote execution server rexd provides only minimal authentication and is easily subverted.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	grep rexd inetd.conf	#rexdl tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/sbin/rpc.rexd rpc.rexd	Make sure that # is the first char from the output of grep. If it is NOT, use the following steps to disable rexd: Edit the "/etc/inetd.conf" file using "vi." Add # in front of line with rexd. Save changes and exit vi. The workstation needs to be rebooted before changes will take effect.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration Test

**Test Objective 33** Verify sendmail does not support the wiz command.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following commands:  % telnet localhost 25 wiz quit	<p>Sendmail should respond to the wiz command with "5nn error return" (e.g., "500 Command unrecognized"). Any response from the server indicating recognition of the command indicates a sendmail vulnerability and sendmail should be replaced.</p> <p>The session should appear similar to the following:</p> <pre> user&gt;telnet localhost 25 Trying 127.0.0.1 ... Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'. 220 ziggy. Sendmail 5.x/SMI-SVR4 ready at Fri, 18 Oct 1996 15:48:03 - 0400 wiz 500 Command unrecognized quit 221 ziggysol24. closing connection Connection closed by foreign host. user&gt;</pre>		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration Test

**Test Objective 34** Verify sendmail does not support the debug command.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  % telnet localhost 25 debug quit	<p>Sendmail should respond to the debug command with "5nn error return" (e.g., "500 Command unrecognized"). Any response from the server indicating recognition of the command indicates a sendmail vulnerability and sendmail should be replaced.</p> <p>The session should appear similar to the following:</p> <pre> user&gt;telnet localhost 25 Trying 127.0.0.1 ... Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'. 220 ziggy. Sendmail 5.x/SMI-SVR4 ready at Fri, 18 Oct 1996 15:48:03 - 0400 debug 500 Command unrecognized quit 221 ziggysol24. closing connection Connection closed by foreign host. user&gt;</pre>		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration Test

**Test Objective 35** Verify sendmail does not support the kill command.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  % telnet localhost 25 kill quit	<p>Sendmail should respond to the kill command with "5nn error return" (e.g., "500 Command unrecognized"). Any response from the server indicating recognition of the command indicates a sendmail vulnerability and sendmail should be replaced.</p> <p>The session should appear similar to the following:</p> <pre> user&gt;telnet localhost 25 Trying 127.0.0.1 ... Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'. 220 ziggy. Sendmail 5.x/SMI-SVR4 ready at Fri, 18 Oct 1996 15:48:03 - 0400 kill 500 Command unrecognized quit 221 ziggysol24. closing connection Connection closed by foreign host. user&gt;</pre>		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration Test

**Test Objective 287** Verify that a variety of known NFS bugs are not present in the system being tested.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1			<p>I just read a post in comp.security.unix entitled "widespread security hole in exporting of filesystems" which claims there are ways to break into a system that has filesystems exported to itself. This hole has been known for quite a while. You can test it by writing a program, I don't think there is any way to use a normal system utility to check for the hole. To exploit, call the mountproc_mnt_1() RPC only use the pmap_rmtcall() routine to call it rather than calling it through a normal clnt_call(). If your mountd is smart enough to turn down requests on non-privileged ports, then you will not be vulnerable to this as the portmapper always makes requests on a non-privileged port.</p> <p>People might want to use the nfsbug detector by Leendert van Doorn. I don't know if it's in the PD, but it will test an NFS server for several (known) security holes.</p>	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Sendmail Configuration

**Test Objective 31** Verify sendmail is configured correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Electronic mail is one of the main reasons for connecting to outside networks. On most versions of Berkeley-derived UNIX systems, including those from Sun, the sendmail program is used to enable the receipt and delivery of mail. Because of its design, sendmail runs as the superuser, making its security holes a significant problem for the entire system. As with the FTP software, older versions of sendmail have several bugs that allow security violations. One of these bugs was used with great success by the Internet worm (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>If you use a vendor version of sendmail, ensure that you have installed the latest patches as sendmail(8) has been a source of a number of security vulnerabilities. Refer to AUSCERT Advisories SA-93:10, AA-95.08 and AA-95.09b and CERT Advisories CA-94:12, CA-95:05 and CA-95:08.</p> <p>Browse the /etc/mail/sendmail.cf and verify the following lines:</p> <p>Mlocal, P=/usr/lib/mail.local, F=flsSoFMmnP, S=10, R=20, A=mail.local -d \$u Mprog, P=/bin/true, F=lsDFMenuP, S=20, R=20, A=sh -c \$u</p>	<p>Sendmail should be properly configured.</p>	<p>If "P=/bin/sh" for Mprog, then change it to "P=/bin/true".</p>	
2	<p>Enter the following command:</p> <p>#vi /etc/mail/sendmail.cf</p>	<p>Any line starting with "OW" only has a "*" next to it (Or does not exist).</p> <p>The options part of the general configuration information section includes lines similar to:</p> <p># log level OL9</p> <p>OR (for sendmail 8.7 or later)</p> <p># log level O LogLevel=9</p> <p>(The higher the number, the more</p>	<p>Sendmail doesn't deliver mail, it invokes the program listed on the Mlocal line in the sendmail.cf file (after setuiding itself to the receiving user). You'll have to check out the capabilities of that program to be sure (although sendmail 8 comes with a binmail delivery program which doesn't do any forwarding).</p>	

		<p>information is logged).</p> <p>The Local and Program Mailer specification section contains a commented out Mprog entry similar to the following:</p> <pre>#Mprog, P=/bin/sh, F=lsDFMeuP, S=10, R=20, A=sh -c \$u</pre> <p>OR a modified Mprog line similar to the following:</p> <pre>Mprog, P=/bin/true, F=lsDFMeuP, S=10, R=20, A=true</pre>		
3	<p>Type the following command:</p> <pre>#vi /etc/mail/mailx.rc</pre>	<p>The following lines appear as specified:</p> <pre>set append dot if t     set SHELL=/bin/true else     set SHELL=/bin/true endif</pre>		
4	<p>As root execute the following command:</p> <pre>#find / -name .forward -exec ls -ald { } \; -exec more { } \;</pre>	<p>There are no .forward files listed.</p>	<p>If the responsible person permits .forward files, any .forward files in user home directories do not execute an unauthorized command or program.</p>	
5	<p>Enter the following command:</p> <pre>#vi /etc/syslog.conf</pre>	<p>The file syslog.conf contains lines similar to:</p> <pre>mail.info    /dev/console mail.info    /var/adm/message</pre> <p>The white space between the syslog.conf entries must be a tab character.</p>	<p>These lines cause mail informational messages to be written to the console and to the messages file.</p>	
6	<p>Review the /etc/aliases file from an administrator command tool using the following command:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/vi /etc/aliases</pre>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MAILER-DAEMON is redirected to Postmaster</li> <li>- audit_warn is redirected to the system administrator's account</li> <li>- nobody is redirected to /dev/null</li> <li>- The decode alias is commented out or not present</li> <li>- All programs executed by an alias are owned by root</li> <li>- All programs executed by an alias have permissions 755</li> <li>- All programs executed by an alias are stored in a root owned systems directory such as /usr/local/bin</li> </ul>	<p>/etc/aliases is used to create administrative mail aliases. The mail aliases are recognized by sendmail for the local host.</p>	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Telnet

**Test Objective 160** Verify a user is always prompted for a password when telneting into the host machine.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Logon to a test account. Attempt to telnet typing the command "telnet localhost". The system should respond with the login prompt. Enter a valid username.	Should be prompted for a password.		



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Trivial FTP

**Test Objective 138** Determine whether Trivial FTP is enabled on the system and if enabled, verify that it has been securely configured.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The TFTP is used to allow diskless hosts to boot from the network. Basically, TFTP is a stripped-down version of FTP - there is no user authentication. Because they are so stripped-down, many implementations of TFTP have security holes (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As an unprivileged user execute the following commands:  % tftp tftp> connect localhost tftp> get /etc/passwd testfile tftp> quit %ls -l testfile %more testfile %rm testfile	If tftp does not respond with "File not found," and instead transfers the file, the version of tftp should be replaced with a newer one.	The use of tftp does not require an account or password on the remote system. The -s options ensures that tftpd will only start with home directory and its root directory both /tftpboot.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Trivial FTP

**Test Objective 140** Verify that Trivial FTP does not run with privileges.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command:  % ls -lF /usr/bin/tftp  Verify that the file is not running SUID or SGID.	The tftp file should not have the SUID or SGID bits set.		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Trusted Hosts

**Test Objective 161** Check the /etc/hosts.equiv file to verify that the default setting of "trust all hosts" has been changed. If there are individual entries in this file, verify that all entries are appropriate.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** One of the most convenient features of the UNIX networking software is the concept of "trusted" hosts. The software allows the specification of other hosts (and possibly users) who are to be considered trusted - remote logins and remote executions from these hosts will be permitted without requiring the user to enter a password. This is very convenient, because users do not have to type their password every time they use the network. Unfortunately, for the same reason, the concept of a trusted host is also extremely insecure (Curry, 1990).

The Internet worm made extensive use of the trusted host concept to spread itself throughout the network. Many sites that had already disallowed trusted hosts did fairly well against the worm compared with those sites that did allow trusted hosts (Curry, 1990).

The file /etc/hosts.equiv can be used by the system administrator to indicate trusted hosts. Each trusted host is listed in the file, one host per line. If a user attempts to login or execute a command remotely from one of the systems listed in hosts.equiv, and that user has an account on the local system with the same login name, access is permitted without requiring a password (Curry, 1990).

Provided adequate care is taken to allow only local hosts in the hosts.equiv file, a reasonable compromise between security and convenience can be achieved. Nonlocal hosts (including hosts at remote sites of the same organization should never be trusted. Also, if there are any machines at your organization that are installed in "public" areas you should not trust these hosts (Curry, 1990).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  %ls -ldgb /etc/hosts.equiv; /bin/more /etc/hosts.equiv	The following response is displayed:  /etc/hosts.equiv: No such file or directory.	Check for the presence of /etc/hosts.equiv after each	

		<p>number of trusted hosts, and all hosts listed are within your domain or under your management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- /etc/hosts.equiv does not include '!' or '#'.</li> <li>- All hosts in /etc/hosts.equiv are specified using IP addresses to mitigate DNS spoof attacks.</li> <li>- Use netgroups in /etc/hosts.equiv for easier management.</li> </ul>	<p>this file, and if that user has an account on the local system with the same login name, the system allows the user to log in without a password. The /etc/hosts.equiv file may have several entries. It should be verified that each entry is appropriate. A line of the form +@hostgroup makes all of the hosts in the network group hostgroup trusted; likewise, a line which has the form - @anotherhostgroup makes all of the hosts in the networkgroup anotherhostgroup specifically not trusted. The file is scanned from the beginning to the end; the scanning stops after the first match. A single line of + in the hosts.equiv file indicates that every known host is trusted. This can create a serious security problem. It is recommended that the /etc/hosts.equiv file be removed altogether, or that the file be replaced with a correctly configured one.</p>	
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**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Vulnerability

**Test Objective 137** Check for an early FTP bug that allows user login as root.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** While looking at ftp, one should check for an older bug that was once widely exploited.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	From a networked host, type the following commands to check for an early FTP bug:  % ftp -n ftp> open <localhost> ftp> quote user ftp ftp> quote pass ftp	If the bug is not fixed, the user will now be logged in as root.	The ftp bug should be fixed.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Vulnerability - UUCP

**Test Objective 172** Verify known UUCP bugs have been fixed.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** UUCP is one of the oldest major subsystems of UNIX, and has had its share of security holes. All of the known security problems have been fixed in recent years. Unfortunately, there are still many old versions of UUCP in use.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	The mail system should not allow mail to be sent directly to a file. Test whether the system allows mail to be sent to a file with the command sequence:  \$ mail /tmp/mailbug this is a mailbug file test ^D	If the file mailbug appears in the /tmp directory, then the mailer is insecure. If you resave the message, "saved as dead.letter", then UUCP software has passed this part of the test.	If UUCP is insecure, remove and replace the uucp software.	
2	As a non-privileged user, execute the following command sequences:  \$ /usr/bin/uux - mail 'root `/bin/touch /tmp/foo`' this is a mailbug command test ^D \$ /usr/bin/uux - mail 'root & /bin/touch /tmp/foo`' this is another test ^D	Mail should be returned saying that `/bin/touch /tmp/foo` is an unknown user. If the mailer executed the touch, (a foo file will be created in the /tmp directory), then the uux program is insecure.	The UUCP system should not allow a command to be encapsulated in addresses to prevent system execution of commands encapsulated in addresses.	
3	As a non-privileged user, execute the following command sequences:  \$ uux - mail 'root & /bin/touch /tmp/foo`' this is another mailbug command test ^D \$ uux - mail 'root & /bin/touch /tmp/foo`' this is another test ^D	Mail should be returned saying that `/bin/touch /tmp/foo` is an unknown user. If the mailer executed the touch, (a foo file will be created in the /tmp directory), then the uux program is insecure.	The UUCP system should not allow a command to be encapsulated in addresses to prevent system execution of commands encapsulated in addresses.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** WWW-HTTP

**Test Objective 176** Verify http client and server processes are not being run as root.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Use the following command to verify that the http client applications are not being run as root:  #/usr/bin/find / -name "*osaic*" \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;  #/usr/bin/find / -name \ "*etscape*" \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;  #/usr/bin/find / -name "http*" \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;	The file permissions on all http clients and servers listed are not owned by root and are not SUID.	Check configuration.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** WWW-HTTPD

**Test Objective 175** Verify the http server daemon is not being run as root, but as a specially created nonprivileged user such as "httpd."

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  #/bin/find / -name "*http*" \ -exec ls -ldb { } \;	File permission listing reveals that the owner of the http server daemon (usually httpd) is not root and not SUID, but as a specially created nonprivileged user such as "httpd."		



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Penetration Test

**Test Objective 274** Verify that the sendmail -d bug does not exist.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>From a command shell, execute the following command:</p> <pre># /usr/lib/sendmail -d3294967296</pre>	This command does not cause a segmentation fault.	<p>On some versions of sendmail it is possible to get root access by supplying greater than normal address space ranges that are used in its array index to the -d flag. The problem is that numbers in this range may skip the range checks and result in accessing negative indexes into the debug array. Hence it is possible to write to locations in memory before the debug array. If a segmentation fault is caused, there is likely a bug in the sendmail executable.</p>	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** promiscuous ethernet interface

**Test Objective 280** Verify that no interface is in promiscuous mode.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	An Ethernet interface that is running in promiscuous mode can be identified with the following command:  /usr/sbin/ifconfig -a   grep -i promisc	Any output is an indication of an ethernet interface in promiscuous mode. This is usually a bad sign and the system should be examined closely to determine if ethernet sniffers are being run on the system.	An interface in promiscuous mode will allow programs to read passwords and other data (from the network) that should be kept secret.	

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** UUCP Disabled

**Test Objective 288** Verify that uucp is not enabled.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** UUCP is one of the oldest major subsystems of UNIX, and has had its share of security holes. All of the known security problems have been fixed in recent years. Unfortunately, there are still many old versions of UUCP in use.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Use the following commands to ensure that uucp is not enabled or installed on the system:  #/usr/ucb/vi /etc/inetd.conf	The uucp entry in /etc/inetd.conf should NOT be enabled (i.e., the first character on the line for uucp should be a "#"). There may not be a UUCP entry in the file. This is OK.	UUCP is one of the oldest major subsystems of UNIX, and has had its share of security holes. Although the design is not secure, the known security holes have been fixed in recent years. Unfortunately, there are still many old versions of UUCP in use.	
2	As root, execute the following command to ensure that uucp is not installed on the system:  /bin/find / \( -user uucp -o -name "*uu*" \) \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;	There should be no output from this command. These daemons handle UUCP file transfers and command executions and should not exist.	If uucp is being used, verify that the UUCP programs are owned by uucp and not by root and have the proper permissions by executing the command below as root:  /bin/find / \( -name uuxqt -o -name uucico -o -name uusched -o -name in.uucpd -o -name uux -o -name uucp \) -exec ls -ldb {} \;  The uucp programs should run SUID uucp, not SUID root. Other than being able to read the spooled UUCP files, the uucp user doesn't have any special privileges. The output should appear similar to the output below:  # /bin/find / \( -name uuxqt -o -name uucico -o -name	

			uusched -o -name in.uucpd -o -name uux -o -name uucp \) -exec ls -ldb {} \; ---s--x--x 1 uucp uucp 64240 Jul 15 1994 /usr/bin/uucp ---s--x--x 1 uucp uucp 68040 Jul 15 1994 /usr/bin/uux drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Aug 20 16:47 /usr/lib/uucp ---s--x--x 1 uucp uucp 169096 Jul 15 1994 /usr/lib/uucp/uucico ---s--x--x 1 uucp uucp 32016 Jul 15 1994 /usr/lib/uucp/uusched ---s--x--x 1 uucp uucp 81040 Jul 15 1994 /usr/lib/uucp/uuxqt -r-xr-xr-x 1 uucp uucp 8320 Jul 15 1994 /usr/sbin/in.uucpd -rw-rw---- 1 uucp mail 376 Oct 14 23:45 /var/mail/uucp -r--r--r-- 1 root sys 215 Aug 20 16:47 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/uu cp drwxr-xr-x 5 uucp uucp 512 Oct 14 23:45 /var/spool/uucp drwxr-xr-x 7 uucp uucp 512 Aug 20 16:46 /var/uucp drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Aug 20 16:46 /var/uucp/.Log/uucico drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Aug 20 16:46 /var/uucp/.Log/uucp drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Oct 14 23:45 /var/uucp/.Log/uux drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Oct 14 23:45 /var/uucp/.Log/uuxqt -rwxr--r-- 2 root sys 202 Jul 16 1994 /etc/init.d/uucp	
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			drwxr-xr-x 2 uucp uucp 512 Aug 20 16:46 /etc/uucp #	
3	<p>Verify that the Permissions file is properly configured using the following command:</p> <pre>#/usr/bin/vi /etc/uucp/Permissions</pre>	<p>If the uucp entry is enabled, the /etc/uucp/Permissions file should allow minimal access (an empty Permissions file provides minimal access). This file and or dir may not exist.</p>	<p>The /etc/uucp/Permissions file specifies the permissions that remote computers have with respect to login, file access, and command execution. There are options that restrict the remote computer's ability to request files and its ability to receive files queued by the local machine. Another option is available that specifies the commands that a remote machine can execute on the local computer.</p> <p>There are two types of Permissions file entries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- LOGNAME Specifies the permissions that take effect when a remote computer logs into (calls) the local computer.</li> <li>- MACHINE Specifies permissions that take effect when the local computer logs into (calls) a remote host.</li> </ul> <p>When using the Permissions file to restrict the level of access granted to remote computers, the following issues should be considered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All login IDs used by remote computers to log in for UUCP communications must appear in one LOGNAME entry.</li> <li>- Any site that is called whose name does not appear in a MACHINE</li> </ul>	

			<p>entry, will have the following default permissions or restrictions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local send and receive requests will be executed.</li> <li>- The remote computer can send files to the local computer's /var/spool/uucppublic directory.</li> <li>- The commands sent by the remote computer for execution on the local computer must be one of the default commands, usually rmail.</li> </ul> <p><b>REQUEST Option</b> When a remote computer calls the local computer and requests a file, this request can be granted or denied. The REQUEST options specifies whether the remote computer can request to set up file transfers from the local computer. The default value is REQUEST=no.</p> <p><b>READ and WRITE Options</b> These options specify the various parts of the file system that uucico can read from or write to. The default for both the READ and WRITE options is the uucppublic directory, /var/spool/uucppublic.</p> <p><b>COMMANDS Option.</b> The COMMANDS option in MACHINE entries can specify the commands that a remote computer can execute on the local computer. The COMMANDS option should be used with great care as misuse can compromise the security of a computer.</p>	
4	Verify any UUCP jobs entered in	Jobs are run as user uucp and script	crontab should run all uucp	

	crontab are run as the user uucp and the script file is owned by root.	files are owned by root.	scripts as the user uucp, rather than as the user root to prevent jobs from running with excessive privileges. However, the scripts themselves should be owned by root, not uucp, so they can't be modified by people using the uucp programs.	
5	Determine if the system has enabled UUCP callback.	UUCP callback is enabled if possible.	Version 2 UUCP has a callback feature that can be used to enhance security. With callback, when a remote system calls the local computer, the system immediately hangs up on the remote system and calls back. No special callback hardware is required to take advantage of UUCP callback, because it is performed by the system software, not by the modem. Note that only one system out of each pair of communicating systems can have callback enabled.	
6	Verify uucp's home directory is in an appropriate directory using the following commands:  \$grep uucp /etc/passwd \$ls -ld `grep uucp /etc/passwd` \   awk -F: 'length(\$6)>0 {print \$6}'`	The uucp home directory should not be in a directory that is world writeable. The dir listed in /etc/passwd for UUCP my not exist. This is OK.	The home directory for the uucp account should not be in the directory /usr/spool/uucp/uucppublic , or any other directory that can be written to by a uucp user.	
7	Use the following command to ensure that there is no .rhosts file in the uucp home directory:  #find `grep uucp /etc/passwd` \   awk -F: 'length(\$6)>0 {print \$6}'` \ -name .rhosts -exec ls -ldb {} \;  Ensure that no uucp owned files or directories are world writeable.	There should be no output from this command.		
8	As root ensure that no uucp owned files or directories are world writeable using the following command:  find / -user uucp -perm -2 \ -exec ls -ldb {} \;	There is no output indicating no files on the system that are owned by uucp and world writeable.		

**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Vulnerability - Telnet

**Test Objective 278** Verify that the telnet bug does not exist.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** There is a security hole in some versions of telnet that will allow any user on the system to overwrite any file. Using the command will overwrite any file in any filesystem with a zero-length root-owned file.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following commands:  #/usr/ucb/vi /tmp/file1  insert some text  Save the file and exit the editor.  #ls /tmp/file1 #/usr/ucb/more /tmp/file1	The file size of /tmp/file1 is larger than 0 and the text inserted into file1 is displayed on the screen.		
2	As an unprivileged user, execute the following command:  \$/usr/bin/telnet -n /tmp/file1 localhost \$ls /tmp/file1	The file size is NOT 0.	If the file size of /tmp/file1 is 0, the telnet daemon must be replaced.	



**Topic:** Network Configuration

**Subtopic:** Vulnerability

**Test Objective 130** Determine if finger and fingerd are enabled on the system. If enabled, verify Finger is securely configured.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** The "finger" service, provided by the finger program, allows you to obtain information about a user such as her full name, home directory, last login time, and in some cases when she last received mail and/or read her mail. The fingerd program allows users on remote hosts to obtain this information (Curry, 1990).

A bug in fingerd was also exercised with success by the Internet worm. If your version of fingerd is older than November 5, 1988, it should be replaced with a newer version (Curry, 1990).

The finger program has two uses: If finger is run with no arguments, the program prints the username, full name, location, login time, and office telephone number of every user currently logged into the local system. If finger is run with a name argument, the program searches through the /etc/passwd file and prints detailed information for every user with a first, last, or user name that matches the name you specified. finger makes it easy for intruders to get a list of the users on the system.

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  user1>finger root@localhost	Error message indicates that the finger daemon is not enabled (e.g., "Connection Refused"). Output of information regarding root indicates that finger is enabled.	Finger should NOT be enabled unless there is a legitimate need for it. Related services that should be considered for removal are systat and netstat.	
2	Execute the following command:  user1>finger @localhost	Only login information on users currently logged on the system is provided, or an error message indicates that the finger daemon is not enabled (e.g., "Connection Refused") will be displayed.	There is a bug in some operating systems which allows a remote finger request to dump all known user finger profiles back out to the requester. The same hack in a different fashion on Solaris 4.1.x will give random users profile.	
3	Execute the following command:  user1>finger 23234123123123123@localhost	Only login information on users currently logged on the system are provided or an error message indicates that the finger daemon is not enabled (e.g., "Connection Refused") will be displayed.	There is a bug in some operating systems which allows a remote finger request to dump all known user finger profiles back out to the requester. The	

			same hack in a different fashion on Solaris 4.1.x will give random users profiles.	
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**Topic:** OBJECT REUSE

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 13** Verify object reuse provisions are enforced by the operating system and/or by features in the application software.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.9.1 No information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions shall be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released back to the COE.  
3.2.9.2 All authorizations to the information contained within a storage object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject from the COE's pool of unused storage objects.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review Solaris SHIELD Basic Security Manual, Chapter 5; turn to the appropriate section(s) which demonstrate the ability of the NMS to satisfy the "Orange Book" requirements.	Section(s) are present in the manual which verify that the component Operating System was designed to meet the C2 requirements of the "Orange Book."	The TCSEC's object reuse requirement for computing systems at C2 level and above is fulfilled by the device allocation mechanism. The device allocation mechanism makes it possible to assign certain devices to one user at a time, so that the device can be accessed by only that user while it is assigned to that user's name.	
2	Review the following file:  /etc/security/device_allocate	<p>The file /etc/security/device_allocate is configured so that the tape drive, floppy, CD-ROM, and audio devices are purged whenever they are allocated.</p> <p>All multiuser devices should be configured as allocatable. The following entries should appear in the device_allocate file for the tape drive, floppy, CD-ROM, and audio, respectively:</p> <pre>st0;st;;;/etc/security/lib/st_clean fd0;fd;;;/etc/security/lib/fd_clean sr0;sr;;;/etc/security/lib/sr_clean audio;audio;;;/etc/security/lib/audio_clean</pre> <p>Each entry should have a device clean entry.</p>	<p>An entry in the device_allocate file does not mean the device is allocatable, unless the entry specifically states the device is allocatable. An asterisk in the fifth field indicates to the system that the device is not allocatable, that is, the system administrator does not require a user to allocate the device before it is used nor to deallocate it afterwards.</p> <p>The device clean scripts address the security requirements that all usable data is purged from</p>	

			<p>a physical device before reuse. By default, cartridge tape drives, floppy disk drives, CD-ROM devices, and audio devices require device clean scripts, which are provided.</p> <p>Device allocation satisfies part of the object reuse requirement. The device clean scripts make sure that data left on a device by one user is cleared before the device is allocatable by another user.</p> <p>(SunSHIELD Basic Security Module Guide)</p>	
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**Topic:** OBJECT REUSE

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 122** Verify that the keyboard, mouse, console, and audio device files are owned by the user logged in.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the /etc/logindevperm file using the following command:  #/usr/bin/vi /etc/logindevperm	The file /etc/logindevperm contains the lines:  /dev/console 0600 /dev/mouse:/dev/kbd /dev/console 0600 /dev/sound/* # audio devices /dev/console 0600 /dev/fbs/* # frame buffers  The file /etc/logindevperm is owned by root and has permissions 644.  Read the man page for logindevperm(4) for more information.	Solaris versions 2.3 and above have a protection facility for framebuffer which is a superset of the functionality provided by /etc/fstab in SunOS 4.1.x.  Under Solaris, /dev/fbs is a directory that contains links to the framebuffer devices. The /etc/logindevperm file contains information that is used by login(1) and ttymon(1M) to change the owner, group, and permissions of devices upon logging into or out of a console device. By default, this file contains lines for the keyboard, mouse, audio, and frame buffer devices.	

**Topic:** SECURE TERMINALS

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 93** Ensure the secure option is removed from all entries that do not require root login capabilities.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command as a privileged user:  vi /etc/default/login  Ensure the # sign has been removed from the line:  CONSOLE=/dev/console	By default, the # sign has been removed from this file.		
2	Attempt to login into the workstation using the userid "root" from another workstation using telnet.	Attempt should fail.		

**Topic:** SECURE TERMINALS

**Subtopic:** Permissions and Ownership

**Test Objective 73** Ensure the "secure terminals" file is configured correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Ensure the "secure terminals" file is owned by root and the permissions are set to "rw-r--r--".  ls -al /etc/default/login	-r--r--r-- 1 root sys 1137 Feb 25 13:20 /etc/default/login	The default permissions, settings, and ownership are listed. The file should be owned by root and has the permission set to "rw-r--r--".	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 143** Determine if any development tools exist on the workstation. Verify development tools such as language compilers, linkers, and debuggers are adequately protected and can only be accessed by authorized users.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>Verify that the development tools listed in the results are owned by a privileged user and cannot be accessed by an unprivileged user.</p> <p>For each of the development tools listed, enter "ls -alg &lt;development tool&gt;".</p> <p>find / -name gcc -exec ls -ld { } \;</p>	<p>The permissions on the tool executables should be 750. The development tools should be assigned to a specific developer's group.</p> <p>Unprivileged users cannot access the development tools listed below:</p> <p>/usr/bin/adb /usr/bin/as /usr/bin/bc /usr/lib/compile /usr/bin/cb /usr/bin/cflow /usr/bin/cxref /usr/bin/dbxtool /usr/bin/ld /usr/bin/lex /usr/bin/m4 /usr/bin/od /usr/bin/rpcgen /usr/bin/yacc /usr/bin/dbx /usr/bin/gcore /usr/bin/sccs /usr/bin/xstr /usr/openwin/bin/cps /usr/openwin/bin/makeafb /usr/5lib/compile /usr/5bin/lint /usr/5bin/od</p>	<p>For operational systems, development tools such as language compilers, linkers, and debuggers are not available on the system. If the responsible security officer has approved the use of specific development tools such as language compilers, linkers, and debuggers on an operational system for a specific purpose, the development tools can be accessed only by authorized users.</p>	



**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Configuration

**Test Objective 148** Verify the installation defaults file is configured correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  \$ /usr/ucb/vi /var/sadm/install/admin/default	The following parameters should be set:  - The mail parameter either should not be present or a system administrative account should be specified. - The runlevel parameter should be set to quit or ask. - The conflict parameter either should be set to quit or ask. - The setuid parameter should NOT be set to nocheck or ask. - The action parameter should be set to quit or ask.	<p>Solaris 2.5.1 system software is delivered in units known as packages. A package is a collection of files and directories required for a software product.</p> <p>admin is a generic name for an ASCII file that defines default installation actions by assigning values to installation parameters. For example, it allows administrators to define how to proceed when the package being installed already exists on the system.</p> <p>The default admin file is located in /var/sadm/install/admin/default. If the -a option is not used when installing a package with the -a option of pkgadd, the default admin file is used.</p> <p>The following parameters may be specified:</p> <p>- mail: Defines a list of users to whom mail should be sent following installation of a package. If the list is empty, no mail is sent. If the parameter is not present in the admin file, the default value of</p>	

			<p>root is used.</p> <p>- runlevel: Indicates resolution if the run level is not correct for the installation or removal of a package. Options are nocheck, which does not make a check for run level, and quit, which aborts installation if the run level is not met.</p> <p>- conflict: Specifies what to do if an installation expects to overwrite a previously installed file, thus creating a conflict between packages. Options are nocheck, which does not check for conflict, and quit, which aborts installation if conflict is detected.</p> <p>- setuid: Checks for executables which will have setuid or setgid bits enabled after installation. Options are nocheck, which does not check for setuid executables, quit, which aborts installation if setuid processes are detected, and nochange, which overrides installation of setuid processes.</p> <p>- action: Determines if action scripts provided by package developers contain possible security impact. Options are nocheck, which ignores security impact of action scripts, and quit, which aborts installation if action scripts may have a negative security impact.</p>	
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**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** init Processes

**Test Objective 155** Verify the processes dispatched by the init process are appropriate.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the file:  /etc/inittab	The default processes launched by the init process are: ap, fs, is, p3, s0, s1, s2, s3, s5, s6, fw, of, rb, sc, and co.	<p>The file /etc/inittab controls process dispatching by the init process. The processes most typically dispatched by init are daemons. The inittab file is composed of entries that are position dependent and have the following format:</p> <p>id:state:action:process</p> <p>The following information further describes the processes:</p> <p>ap STREAMS module initialization fs File system check is Default run level p3 Power fail shutdown s0 Run level 0 s1 Run level 1 s2 Run level 2 s3 Run level 3 s5 Run level 5 s6 Runl level 6 of Off fw Firmware RB Reboot &lt;may or may not have&gt; rb Reboot single-user sc Service access controller initialization co Console initialization</p>	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Loaded OS Modules

**Test Objective 149** Determine the OS modules that have been installed on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	From the command line as root type:  #modinfo	The specific modules that are approved are hardware-dependent. Only approved kernel modules are present in the directory that contains the dynamically loadable kernel modules. The directory is specified by the "moddir" variable, set in the file /etc/system).	The modinfo command displays information about the loaded modules. The format of the information is as follows:  Id Loadaddr Size Info Rev Module Name  where Id is the module ID, Loadaddr is the starting text address, size is the size of text, data, and bss in bytes, Info is module specific info, Rev is the revision of the loadable modules system, and Module Name is the filename and description of the module.	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Operating System

**Test Objective 151** Verify the system kernel configuration file is correct.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the file:  /etc/system	<p>The system kernel configuration file /etc/system contains:</p> <pre># Enable C2 Audit set c2audit:audit_load = 1 # Enable NFS port monitoring set nfs:nfs_portmon = 1</pre> <p>For DII COE the following additional settings should be present:</p> <pre>set shmsys:shminfo_shmmax=0x4000000 set shmsys:shminfo_shmmin=1 set shmsys:shminfo_shmmni=256 set shmsys:shminfo_shmseg=128 set enable_sm_wa=1</pre>	<p>The system file is used for customizing the operation of the kernel. The recommended procedure is to preserve the original system file before modifying it. If the line "nfs_portmon=1" is not in this file, then it should be added to the file and the system should be rebooted.</p> <p>The boot program contains a list of default kernel modules to be loaded. The /etc/system configuration file, read at boot time, can be used to override the list of default modules. Care should be used when modifying the system file as it modifies the operation of the kernel.</p>	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Operating System

**Test Objective 153** Verify the appropriate operating system patches have been applied.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	From the command line as root type:  #showrev -a	Be sure to check <a href="http://sunsite.unc.edu/sun/inform/patches.html#2.5.1-patches">http://sunsite.unc.edu/sun/inform/patches.html#2.5.1-patches</a> . As of 30 December 1996, the recommended patches are:  2.5.1 recommended cluster (be sure to check README)  103663-03: [updated] [README] SunOS 5.5.1: DNS spoofing is possible per Cern ca-96.02 (364637 bytes) 103558-05: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: admintool fixes for security and missing swmtool options (398287 bytes) 103582-02: [updated] [README] SunOS 5.5.1: /kernel/drv/tcp patch (143921 bytes) 103594-06: [updated] [README] SunOS 5.5.1: /usr/lib/sendmail fixes (239651 bytes) 103612-07: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: libc, libnsl, nis_cachemgr and rpc.nisd patch (2816709 bytes) 103630-03: [updated] [README] SunOS 5.5.1: ip and ifconfig patch (634635 bytes) 103640-03: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: kernel patch (2261271 bytes) 103680-01: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: nsd/nsd_nischeck rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (101203 bytes) 103683-01: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: nss_dns.so.1 rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (79701 bytes) 103686-01: [README] SunOS 5.5.1: rpc.nisd_resolv rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (89859 bytes) 103696-01: [README] SunOS	showrev displays revision information for the current hardware and software. With no arguments, showrev shows the system revision information including hostname, hostid, release, kernel architecture, application architecture, hardware provider, domain, and kernel version. The -a option prints all system revision information available. Window system and patch information are added.  Current operating system patch recommendations can be obtained from the SunSolve software or from the following FTP site:  <a href="http://sunsite.unc.edu/pub/sun-info/sun-patches/Solaris2.4.Patches">sunsite.unc.edu/pub/sun-info/sun-patches/Solaris2.4.Patches</a>  Some patches may re-enable default configurations. For this reason, it is important to go through this checklist after installing any new patches or packages.  Verify the digital signature of any signed files. Tools like PGP may be used to sign files and to verify	

	<p>5.5.1: /sbin/su and /usr/bin/su patch (328495 bytes)  103743-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: XFN source modifications for BIND 4.9.3 (109839 bytes)  103817-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: rdist suffers from buffer overflow (116431 bytes)</p> <p>Security patches</p> <p>103558-05: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: admintool fixes for security and missing swmtool options (398287 bytes)  103594-06: [updated] [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: /usr/lib/sendmail fixes (239651 bytes)  103612-07: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: libc, libnsl, nis_cachemgr and rpc.nisd patch (2816709 bytes)  103663-03: [updated] [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: DNS spoofing is possible per Cern ca-96.02 (364637 bytes)  103680-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: nsd/nsd_nischeck rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (101203 bytes)  103683-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: nss_dns.so.1 rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (79701 bytes)  103686-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: rpc.nisd_resolv rebuild for BIND 4.9.3 (89859 bytes)  103696-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: /sbin/su and /usr/bin/su patch (328495 bytes)  103743-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: XFN source modifications for BIND 4.9.3 (109839 bytes)  103817-01: [README] SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: rdist suffers from buffer overflow (116431 bytes)  103866-02: [README] * SunOS</p> <p>5.5.1: BCP (binary compatibility) patch (636155 bytes)  103879-03: [README] *</p> <p>OpenWindows 3.5.1: KCMS tools have security vulnerability (197647 bytes)  103900-01: [README] *</p> <p>OpenWindows 3.5.1: XView Binary Compatibility Patch (859075 bytes)</p>	<p>those signatures. If an md5(1) checksum is supplied, then verify the checksum information to confirm that a valid copy has been retrieved. If a generic sum(1) checksum is provided, be sure to verify it.</p>	
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**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Printer Definition

**Test Objective 154** Verify only appropriate printers are defined.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the /etc/lp/printers directory using the following command:  ls -ls /etc/lp/printers	Only appropriate local and remote printers should be defined. In some cases, there may not be any printers defined.	This directory contains queues and configuration files for various printers and is set up by admintool. One configuration file is "users.deny" that denies specified users from using a particular printer. NOTE: Printers may not be defined for the workstation, therefore, no files will be listed.	



**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Security Support Tools

**Test Objective 188** Verify security support tools are provided to periodically determine the security posture of systems, to validate the strength of the authentication mechanism, and to determine changes to designated systems and application files.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** 3.2.15.6 The COE shall provide a standard set of security support tools to periodically determine the security posture of COE systems.  
3.2.15.6.1 The COE shall provide the capability to validate the strength of the authentication mechanism. For example, the capability will check for potentially weak passwords.  
3.2.15.6.2 The COE shall provide the capability to determine changes to designated systems and applications files, e.g., password or rc.\* files.

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the file:  /usr/aset/asetenv	<p>The ASET should be scheduled to run on a regular basis, and should check all system files and any other security-relevant files added to the system. The cron entry should look something like the following example:</p> <pre>0 0 * * * /usr/aset/aset -l med -d /usr/aset</pre> <p>The ASET should check all system files and any other security-relevant files added to the system. Look for an ASET entry in root's cron jobs. ASET should be configured to tune the system. The /usr/aset/masters/cklist.med file is correct. The file /usr/aset/asetenv is set so the ASET checks all system files and any other security-relevant files added to the system. The file /usr/aset/asetenv is set so the ASET checks system files, users and groups, system configuration, environment, and eeprom. The root crontab file contains an ASET entry that runs ASET regularly (preferably daily) and checks security at least at the medium security level. Baseline alterations are audited alterations. Security administrator should check that any ASET-discovered security</p>	<p>ASET should be scheduled to run regularly (preferably daily) and to check security at least at the medium security level.</p> <p>ASET depends on a correctly established and maintained configuration baseline for the kernel. The correct functioning of ASET requires the security administrator to check that proper kernel baseline updates are made. The auditing of all baseline alterations will notify the system administrator of any improper alterations. At the level ASET has to run in DII COE version 3.0, ASET performs a number of security checks. The security administrator should check that any ASET-discovered security weaknesses are corrected, if possible.</p>	

		weaknesses are corrected, if possible.		
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**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** User Environment Configuration

**Test Objective 158** Verify the user environment is configured properly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	<p>As root, execute the following shell script for printing the umask value for each user:</p> <pre>#!/bin/sh date uname -a PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/ucb  HOMEDIRS=`cat /etc/passwd   awk -F: 'length(\$6)&gt;0 {print \$6}'   sort -u` FILES=".cshrc .login .profile " for dir in \$HOMEDIRS do     echo "-----"     echo Home Directory being checked is \$dir     for file in \$FILES     do         ls -ald \$dir/\$file         if [ -f \$dir/\$file ]         then             grep -s umask /dev/null \$dir/\$file         fi     done done echo "-----"</pre>	<p>The umask value for each user is set to something sensible like 027 or 077.</p>	<p>This script DOES NOT work using NIS or NIS+! When a file or directory is created, it has a default set of permissions. These default permissions are determined by the value of umask in the system file /etc/profile, or in a user's .cshrc or .login file. By default, the system sets the permissions on a text file to 666, granting read and write permission to user, group, and others, and to 777 on a directory or executable. The value assigned by umask is subtracted from the default. This has the effect of denying permissions in the same way that chmod grants them. If possible, a .cshrc, .login, and .profile should be created for each user owned by root and readable by the user with correct environment settings.</p>	
2	<p>Utilize the following shell script for viewing the account initialization files for each user:</p> <pre>#!/bin/sh date uname -a PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/etc:/usr/ucb  HOMEDIRS=`cat /etc/passwd   awk -F: 'length(\$6)&gt;0 {print \$6}'   sort -u`</pre>	<p>All account initialization files in user \$HOME, and the default files that are used if these files are not present, have been reviewed to ensure that only acceptable actions are taken. Acceptable actions include: set user terminal type, check for new e-mail, and set a proper umask (027 or 077). Any other actions should be explicitly approved by the responsible security officer.</p>	<p>This script DOES NOT work using NIS or NIS+! [Acceptable actions for .mwmrc and .Xsession TBD.] If possible, a .cshrc, .login, and .profile should be created for each user owned by root and readable by the user with correct environment settings.</p>	

	<pre>FILES=".cshrc .login .profile .logout .mwmmrc .Xsession .Xdefaults .exrc .forward .rhosts" for dir in \$HOMEDIRS do     echo "-----"     echo Home Directory being checked is \$dir     for file in \$FILES     do         ls -ald \$dir/\$file         if [ -f \$dir/\$file ]         then             more \$dir/\$file         fi     done done echo "-----"</pre>	<p>All user account initialization files are owned by the user (or root) and have permissions 640.</p>		
3	<p>Ensure the default account initialization files are secure. A shell script for viewing the files follows:</p> <pre>#!/bin/sh date #!/bin/sh date uname -a echo ----- echo /etc/.profile echo ----- ls -al /etc/.profile cat /etc/.profile  echo ----- echo /etc/skel/local.cshrc echo ----- ls -al /etc/skel/local.cshrc cat /etc/skel/local.cshrc  echo ----- echo /etc/skel/local.login echo ----- ls -al /etc/skel/local.login cat /etc/skel/local.login  echo ----- echo /etc/skel/local.profile echo ----- ls -al /etc/skel/local.profile cat /etc/skel/local.profile  echo ----- echo /etc/profile</pre>	<p>All default account initialization files that are used if user account initialization files are not present have been reviewed to ensure that only acceptable actions are taken. Acceptable actions include: set user terminal type, check for new e-mail, and set a proper umask (027 or 077). Any other actions should be explicitly approved by the responsible security officer.</p> <p>The default account initialization files are owned by root and have permissions 644.</p>	<p>/etc/profile allows the system administrator to perform services for the entire user community. The file \$HOME/.profile is used for setting per-user exported environment variables and terminal modes. Care must be taken in providing system-wide services in /etc/profile.</p>	

<pre> echo ----- ls -al /etc/profile cat /etc/profile  echo ----- echo ----- echo DII COE initialization files echo ----- echo ----- echo /etc/csh.login echo ----- ls -al /etc/csh.login cat /etc/csh.login  echo ----- echo /etc/dt/config/sys.dtprofile echo ----- ls -al /etc/dt/config/sys.dtprofile cat /etc/dt/config/sys.dtprofile  echo ----- echo /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.cshrc c echo ----- ls -al /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.cshrc c cat /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.cshrc c  echo ----- echo /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.login n echo ----- ls -al /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.login n cat /h/USERS/local/sysadmin/Scripts/.login n  echo ----- echo /h/COE/Scripts/.cshrc.COE echo ----- ls -al /h/COE/Scripts/.cshrc.COE cat /h/COE/Scripts/.cshrc.COE  echo ----- echo /h/COE/Scripts/.login.COE echo ----- </pre>			
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	<pre>ls -al /h/COE/Scripts/.login.COE cat /h/COE/Scripts/.login.COE  echo ----- echo /h/COE/Scripts/.xsession.COE echo ----- ls -al /h/COE/Scripts/.xsession.COE cat /h/COE/Scripts/.xsession.COE  echo ----- echo \$COE_HOME/Scripts echo ----- ls -alg \$COE_HOME/Scripts echo -----</pre>			
4	<p>As root, execute the following command:</p> <pre>/bin/find / -name ".exrc" -print -exec ls -ls {} \; -exec /usr/bin/more {} \;</pre>	<p>There are no .exrc files on the system or the "exrc" option for each user is set to "noexrc".</p>	<p>The editing environment defaults to certain configuration options. When an editing session is initiated, vi attempts to read the EXINIT environment variable. If it exists, the editor uses the values defined in EXINIT, otherwise the values set in \$HOME/.exrc are used. If \$HOME/.exrc does not exist, the default values are used.</p> <p>To use a copy of .exrc located in the current directory other than \$HOME, set the exrc option in EXINIT or \$HOME/.exrc. Options set in EXINIT can be turned off in a local .exrc only if exrc is set in EXINIT or \$HOME/.exrc.</p>	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Window Tool Scripts

**Test Objective 159** Verify the window tool scripts are appropriately configured.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Browse the following file:  /usr/openwin/lib/openwin-init	The filemgr and postmaster should not be executed.	This file contains scripts that run when executing a window tool and the scripts can be modified. The /usr/openwin/lib directory contains configuration files for the window system, and the openwin-init file contains OpenWindows default initialization information. If filemgr or postmaster is listed in openwin-init file, remove these line(s).	
2	Browse the /usr/openwin/lib/openwin-menu file.	Unnecessary menu items should be commented out.	This file contains the default OpenWindows root menu.	
3	Browse the /usr/openwin/lib/openwin-sys file.	The autolockscreen should be appropriately configured. Unnecessary settings should be commented out.	This file contains the OpenWindows system initialization information.	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Environment Variables

**Test Objective 295** Verify that only appropriate environmental variables are set at system boot time.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Review the following file:  /etc/default/init	By default, only the TIMEZONE variable is set. Any other variable settings should be justified.	The init process is started and reads the /etc/default/init file to set any environment variables. By default, only the TIMEZONE variable is set. (Solaris 2.5 System Administration Guide)	



**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Permissions

**Test Objective 281** Verify that the crash program permissions are set correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Attempt to execute the crash program as an unprivileged user by typing the following command:  /usr/sbin/crash	An error similar to the following is produced:  /usr/sbin/crash: Permission denied	crash(1) allows you to snoop through kmem too (inherited from Solaris)	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Printer

**Test Objective 297** If the security policy limits user access to a printer, verify that the policy is implemented correctly.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  lpstat -p all -l	The printer security policy should be implemented correctly.	For each printer, the LP print service keeps two lists of users: an "allow-list" of people allowed to use the printer, and a "deny-list" of people denied access to the printer. With the -u allow option, the users listed are added to the allow-list and removed from the deny-list. With the -u deny option, the users listed are added to the deny-list and removed from the allow-list.  The lpstat command prints information about the current status of the LP print service. (Solaris 2.5 System Administration Guide, lpadmin man page)	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** System Packages

**Test Objective 296** Verify that only appropriate packages are installed.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Execute the following command:  #pkginfo	Only appropriate packages should be installed. If an unexpected package is installed, the files associated with the package can be determined by executing the following command:  #pkgchk -v <pkgid>	The status of an installed package can be checked with the pkgchk command. The -v option specifies verbose mode, which displays file names as pkgchk processes them (Solaris 2.5 System Administration Guide).	

**Topic:** System Architecture

**Subtopic:** Operating System

**Test Objective 152** Determine the OS version installed. Verify that it is the correct version.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type in the following command:  #uname -a	Output SIMILIAR to the following is printed to the screen:  SunOS ziggysol251 5.5.1 generic sun4m sparc	The most important parts are the "SunOS" and the "5.5.1" portions that indicate that the host being tested is running the Solaris 2.5.1 operating system.	

**Topic:** X WINDOW SYSTEM

**Subtopic:** Use of xauth access control

**Test Objective 183** Verify the system uses the xauth X server access control mechanism instead of the xhosts mechanism.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:**

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  /bin/find /etc -name "*rc*" -type f \ -exec ls -lgdb {} \; \ -exec /bin/grep xdm {} \;	xdm is initiated with -auth \$HOME/.Xauthority.		
2	As an unprivileged user, execute the following command:  echo \$XAUTHORITY	This variable should exist and contains the magic cookie used to authenticate valid users attempting to connect to the X server. If xauth is being used and this variable is not present, then the \$HOME/.Xauthority file contains the magic cookie (this is not as secure).		
3	As root, execute the following command:  /bin/find / -name xdm-config \ -exec ls -lgdb {} \; \ -exec /usr/ucb/more {} \;	The following lines are included:  DisplayManager*authorize: true DisplayManager*authname: XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1	The first line turns on authorization for all X servers controlled by a given xdm program. The second line sets the authority scheme to XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1.	

**Topic:** X WINDOW SYSTEM

**Subtopic:**

**Test Objective 68** Ensure the setuid and setgid privilege bits are not set on the xterm program.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** X is a popular network-based window system that allows many programs to share a single graphical display. The X Window System is a major security hazard. Although there are a number of mechanisms inside X to give some security features, these can be circumvented in many circumstances (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	As root, execute the following command:  /bin/find / -name xterm \ -exec ls -ldg {} \;	The xterm program is not SUID or SGID.	On DII COE perform the same command substituting dtterm for xterm.	

**Topic:** X WINDOW SYSTEM

**Subtopic:** xhost utility

**Test Objective 179** Verify the systems listed in xhost are appropriate. Determine what release of X is used on the system.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** X uses a system called xhost to provide a minimal amount of security for window system users. Each X Window Server has a built-in list of hosts from which it will accept connections; connections from all other hosts are refused. The design of the X Window System allows any client that successfully connects to the X Window Server to exercise complete control over the display. If a person can log into a system, they can capture another user's keystrokes no matter how the xhosts is set (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

Release 4 of the X Window Protocol has a secure feature on the xterm command that makes the window change its color if it is not receiving its input directly from the keyboard. This is a partial fix, but it is not complete (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	Type the following command to produce a list of which hosts are listed in xhost:  % xhost	Only trusted hosts should be in list returned or the message "Access control enabled, only authorized clients can connect" will be returned.	It is preferable that the xhost security not be used and that xauth or another security mechanism be used.	

**Topic:** X WINDOW SYSTEM

**Subtopic:** Denial of Service

**Test Objective 182** Determine if the X server is vulnerable to the specified denial of service attack.

**DII COE SRS Requirement:** None Identified

**Rationale:** Even if the xhost facility is used, the X Window System may be vulnerable to attack from computers not in the xhost list. The X11R3 Window Server reads a small packet from the client before it determines whether or not the client is in the xhost list. If a client connects to the X Server but does not transmit this initial packet, the X Server halts all operation until it times out in 30 seconds (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1992).

#	Required Action	Expected Results	Comments	0
1	From a networked host, type the following command:  % telnet <localhost> 6000 % telnet <localhost> 6001	Should get a message "Unable to connect". If the X server has a problem, the workstation's display will freeze. In some X implementations, the X server will time out after 30 seconds and resume normal operations. Under other X implementations, the server will remain blocked until the connection is aborted.	The denial of service vulnerability should not exist.	